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I.

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to inheritance rights in the United States, it is
an unfortunate reality that, while the number of American families
1
who fall into the nuclear-family model has declined, the laws of
intestate succession have nonetheless continued to cling to that
2
model for purposes of defining an intestate decedent’s “family.”
3
Accordingly, for the many Americans who die intestate, there is a
strong likelihood that those whom the decedent considered to be
4
family will not inherit any of the decedent’s estate. As a result,
* Lawyering Process Professor at the William S. Boyd School of Law at
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Deans Richard Morgan and Joan
Howarth provided financial support for this project, made possible in part by
the generosity of William S. Boyd and James E. Rogers. I also thank Linda
Edwards, Kristin Gerdy, and Joan Magat, as well as my colleagues at the Boyd
School of Law, especially Peter Bayer, Richard Brown, Lynne Henderson, Sylvia
Lazos, Ann McGinley, Terrill Pollman, Rebecca Scharf, and David Thronson, all
of whom contributed valuable suggestions. Special thanks to Tom Carns for all
of his support and encouragement.
1. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991)
[hereinafter Family Resemblance] (“The traditional nuclear family is rapidly
becoming an American anachronism.”).
2. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80
N.C. L. REV. 199, 200 (2001) (“At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the
inheritance system stands as one of the last bastions of the traditional
American family. Many of its rules and doctrines appear frozen in time,
remnants of a bygone era of nuclear families bound together by lifelong
affection and support.” (citation omitted)); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy
Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that, with a few
limited exceptions, “intestacy laws still reflect the nuclear family norm”).
3. See Gary, supra note 2, at 15–16; see also infra notes 194–97 and
accompanying text.
4. See Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (“As family structure becomes less traditional, it is likely that the timehonored rules of intestacy will frequently fail to accommodate a decedent’s true
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critics of the modern intestacy scheme have called for more inclusive
inheritance rights to help encompass those who do not fit the
5
“traditional” definition of family. As an illustration of one such
family, consider the story of Hattie O’Neal.
Hattie O’Neal is African American and was born in 1949 to
6
Bessie Broughton, an unwed mother. When her mother died in
1957, Hattie was sent to live with a relative in New York City. In
fact, Hattie would spend the next four years living in several
different households, which were sometimes headed by relatives and
other times by non-relatives who were simply in want of a
“daughter.” Hattie was eventually sent to Georgia to live with
Estelle Page, her paternal aunt. Soon thereafter, Page learned of a
married couple, Mr. and Mrs. Roswell Cook, who were looking to
adopt a little girl. After Page told the Cooks about Hattie, the
couple came and met Hattie, who at this time was around twelve
years of age, and ultimately took her home with them. From the
time she went home with the Cooks until she married in 1975,
Hattie was in all meaningful ways their “daughter.” Although she
was never formally adopted and retained her own last name, the
Cooks raised her as their own. Even when the Cooks divorced in the
1970s, Mr. Cook kept Hattie with him, continuing to raise her and
providing for her education. Furthermore, after Hattie’s marriage,
when she had children of her own, Mr. Cook referred to them as his
“grandchildren.” Nonetheless, in 1991, Mr. Cook died without a
will, which raises the following question: Does Hattie have the right
7
to inherit as the child of Mr. Cook?
Historically, the answer to that question would have been “no.”
In fact, at one point the only children who could inherit from a
decedent were the decedent’s biological children because “[f]or
8
centuries laws tied inheritance to bloodline and legitimacy.”
However, the laws of intestate succession have changed, albeit in a
limited manner, to try to better reflect the evolution of the American
family. For example, currently all states have intestacy statutes
that allow both illegitimate and adopted children to inherit the same

testamentary intent.”).
5. See, e.g., Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to
Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1526–27 (2000); see also infra notes 201–02 and
accompanying text.
6. See O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 491 (Ga. 1994); see also JESSE
DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 99 (7th ed. 2005) (pointing out
that O’Neal is African American).
7. O’Neal, 439 S.E.2d at 491.
8. Gary, supra note 2, at 37.
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as marital and biological children. Nonetheless, even this expanded
definition of “children” fails to protect children, like Hattie, who
were never formally adopted. As a result, some courts, “by
10
dipping . . . into their reservoir of equity powers,” have turned to
the doctrine of equitable adoption to adjudicate situations like
Hattie’s.
Claims of equitable adoption, also known as “virtual adoption,”
11
“de facto adoption,” and “adoption by estoppel,” frequently arise in
the context of intestate decedents who are survived by someone who,
although raised by the decedent and treated as the decedent’s child,
12
was never formally adopted.
Again, for those individuals, the
intestate succession statutes historically offered no protection
whatsoever, as the statutes applied only to biological descendants
and formally adopted children. However, given that not all persons
who a decedent may consider to be his “children” may have been
formally adopted and, further, that excluding such a person from
inheritance can cause great hardship to the surviving “child,” courts
have used the doctrine of equitable adoption to treat such a person,
for purposes of intestate succession, as though she were formally
13
adopted and thus entitled to inherit as a child of the decedent.
Despite the doctrine’s laudatory goals, this Article focuses on
how the doctrine of equitable adoption, although created to make
inheritance rights more inclusive, has instead served to reaffirm the
preeminence of the nuclear family model as the standard for
identifying the “children” of an intestate decedent. Specifically, the
tests that courts have developed to determine whether an equitable
adoption exists almost invariably require that there first have been
14
15
a contract to adopt between the natural and “foster” parents.
Although courts developed this requirement to help prevent fraud,
the requirement has nonetheless made it nearly impossible for
9. See generally Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the
Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 113–14; Gary, supra note 2, at
57.
10. Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem
of Doctrinal Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 548 (2000).
11. See Rebecca C. Bell, Comment, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of
Creating an Exception to the Statutory Scheme, 29 STETSON L. REV. 415, 416 n.3
(1999).
12. See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and
Association: Who Should Get What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult
Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37
VAND. L. REV. 711, 766–67 (1984).
13. See infra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
14. For purposes of this Article, the term “foster parent” is used to refer to
an individual who has informally adopted a child.
15. See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
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informally adopted children to qualify as equitably adopted children.
While other commentators have examined the restrictive nature
of the equitable adoption doctrine, the purpose of this Article is to
level a new criticism at the doctrine as it currently exists.
Specifically, the prevailing tests for determining whether an
equitable adoption has taken place are not only overly restrictive,
but are also most likely to have a disproportionately negative impact
on this country’s minority racial and ethnic communities. Indeed,
given that the rate of informal adoptions is relatively high among
many of these minority communities currently living in the United
16
States, it is the children of these minority families who are more
likely to be excluded as heirs, even under this “inclusive” doctrine,
simply by virtue of being reared in the “nontraditional” extended
family model.
Part I will first detail the role that informal adoption plays
within the extended family model as that model currently exists
within the two most predominant minority ethnic communities in
the United States. Against that backdrop, Part II will then delve
more deeply into the law of intestate succession and, more
specifically, the equitable adoption doctrine, looking both at the
underlying policies as well as the specific tests that courts have
developed to determine if someone qualifies as an equitably adopted
child. In light of these judicially created tests, Part III will discuss
the difficulties that an informally adopted child faces when trying to
establish himself as an equitably adopted child. Finally, as a result
of how underinclusive and potentially discriminatory the current
tests are under the equitable adoption doctrine, Part IV will explore
ways in which courts and legislatures can make the doctrine and the
laws of intestate succession more cognizant of and more responsive
to informally adopted children in the United States.
II.

INFORMAL ADOPTION WITHIN THE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM

George Murdock is credited with having coined the term
17
“nuclear family.” In 1949, Murdock defined the term as “a social
group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation,
and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of
whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or
18
more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults.”
However, Murdock did not claim that most family units fell into the
16. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
17. See Marie A. Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage
Wars: Restoring the Household to Its Proper Place, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 195, 218 (2004).
18. Id.
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nuclear model; instead, Murdock merely laid out the husband-wifechild triad as a basic building block upon which most families are
19
built.
Furthermore, Murdock, who studied the ethnographies of
250 different cultures throughout the world, found that the nuclearfamily model was only the norm in about twenty-five percent of
20
those cultures.
In contrast, the majority of the cultures that
Murdock looked at followed an extended family model, which was
defined as a married adult residing not only with a spouse and
children, but also with some members of the adult’s original nuclear
21
family.
Even today, census data reveals a similar distribution of family
22
models within the United States. Indeed, a number of studies have
shown that the majority of American families do not mirror the
23
nuclear-family model. Nonetheless, as quite a few scholars have
noted, many of the modern legal and social policies in America
24
continue to use the nuclear-family model as the norm.
19. Bron B. Ingoldsby, Family Origin and Universality, in FAMILIES IN
MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 83, 84 (Bron B. Ingoldsby & Suzanna Smith eds.,
1995) (pointing out that Murdock concluded that “the nuclear family is a
universal human social grouping that either stands on its own or serves as the
basis for the more complex forms” (citation omitted)). But see Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a
Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569,
589 (noting that other anthropologists reject Murdock’s contention of the
nuclear family as the “basic unit of society”).
20. Failinger, supra note 17, at 219.
21. Id.; see also Yoshinori Kamo, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Extended
Family Households, 43 SOC. PERSP. 211, 212 (2000) (defining the extended
family as “a household unit including any family members outside the core
nuclear family unit”); Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer L. Gillan, From Our Family
to Yours: Rethinking the “Beneficial Family” and Marriage-Centric Corporate
Benefit Programs, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6–7 (2005) (“Historically, in
global cultures, the term ‘family’ referred to a household made up not only of
blood relatives, but also a host of extended family members, nonrelative
boarders, and slaves living in a common residence.”).
22. See JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1–3 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf.
Ironically,
despite that recognition by the Census Bureau, it continues to define “family”
using the nuclear family model, which provides that “[a] family is a group of two
people or more (one of whom is the householder) related by birth, marriage, or
adoption and residing together.” U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey (CPS) - Definitions and Explanations, http://www.census.gov
/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
23. See Failinger, supra note 17, at 219; Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 570
(“Today, far from representing a radical fringe, nonnuclear families have
become the norm for a generation.”).
24. See Failinger, supra note 17, at 206 (“Despite this evidence of plural
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Furthermore, as many legal commentators have pointed out, a
number of laws that have a direct bearing on family all but ignore
25
the extended-family model.
This omission is particularly
objectionable given that the extended family model is much more
prevalent within many of the current ethnic minority communities
26
living in the United States. As Justice Brennan wrote in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland,
The “extended family” that provided generations of early
Americans with social services and economic and emotional
support in times of hardship, and was the beachhead for
successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities,
remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under
the goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern—
virtually a means of survival—for large numbers of the poor
and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled
pooling of scant resources requires compelled sharing of a
27
household.

Under the extended family model, the “family” extends beyond
the household and also encompasses “kinships,” which would
28
include other relationships arising from both blood and marriage.

family/household structures, marriage and the nuclear family remain the chief
focus of social and cultural debates in the United States.”); see also Joyce E.
McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse Families: Building on
Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 45–49 (1998)
(providing a survey of scholarship concerning the legal problems faced by
“parents who do not live in the traditional nuclear family”); Ponte & Gillan,
supra note 21, at 41 (noting the “privileging of, and reverential attitude toward,
the nuclear family”).
25. See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black
Community: A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649,
1652–53 (1995) (discussing how current adoption policy is based on the nuclear
family model); Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 580 (noting that nontraditional
families “are not fully recognized by laws which privilege the nuclear family”).
26. See Failinger, supra note 17, at 234 (“Modern American ethnographic
studies show similar patterns of extended family behavior, particularly when
one looks at families from non-European cultures.”); Kamo, supra note 21, at
211 (“[L]iving in extended family households is much more common among
certain groups of people [including] racial/ethnic minorities.”). Of course, as
others have noted, it is difficult to know with any specificity the actual
incidence of those families in the United States living in an extended family
arrangement.
27. 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
28. See Max E. Stanton, Patterns of Kinship and Residence, in FAMILIES IN
MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 97, 100 (“The extended family is
a corporate economic and political unit, as well as a kinship-based group.”); see
generally C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court’s Family Law Doctrine
Revisited: Insights from Social Science on Family Structures and Kinship
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Examples of such kinships include grandparents, aunts, uncles,
cousins, and other relatives who, although related by blood or
marriage, typically do not reside in the home with the nuclear
29
family. However, the extended family model frequently includes
those without blood or marriage ties. In fact, there is another class
of relationships included within the extended family called “fictive
kinships,” which anthropologists define as “a binding relationship
between individuals similar to that of close blood kin but not based
30
on birth, marriage or descent.”
Examples of a fictive kinship,
which Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has described as “culturally
31
codified,”
would include both the important role that the
32
compadrazgo, or godparent, plays in many Hispanic cultures, as
33
well as the African American tradition of “othermothering.”
As many anthropologists have noted, the extended family model
and its inclusion of kinship relationships has a number of
34
advantages. However, one of the primary benefits of this model is
the greater ability of family units to care for children in need of
35
support.
Of course, in all ethnic groups, relatives can often be
counted on to rear orphaned children. However, within certain
ethnic and racial communities, the practice of “kinship care” is much
36
more pervasive.
In fact, in many such communities, it is not
uncommon for a relative, or even an unrelated member of the larger

Change in the United States, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431 (2004).
29. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best:
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV.
865, 908 (2003).
30. Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 591–92; see also CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR
KIN: STRUGGLES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 57–61 (1974) (describing
the process by which, within the African American community, friendships can
evolve into fictive kinships).
31. Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 591.
32. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 594 (“[B]onds of kinship provide
a structure of interconnectedness and obligation sufficiently powerful, resilient,
and flexible to insure support and shelter for all members of the community in
times of need and to serve as a buffer between individuals and the impersonal
state.”).
35. Holmes, supra note 25, at 1665 (outlining the “child-centered nature of
the complex Black extended family structure”); Cynthia R. Mabry, African
Americans “Are Not Carbon Copies” of White Americans—The Role of African
American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 405, 437–38 (1998).
36. Rebecca L. Hegar & Maria Scannapieco, Grandma’s Babies: The
Problem of Welfare Eligibility for Children Raised by Relatives, 27 J. SOC. &
SOC. WELFARE 153, 155–56 (2000).
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ethnic community, to go so far as to informally adopt a needy child.
As noted by the North American Council on Adoptable Children,
“[a]s has been the case for years, unstructured, extended-family
adoption continues to play a definitive role in the cultural make-up
38
of many communities of color.”
This practice of informal adoption has been defined as “[t]he
process by which dependent children are informally reared by adults
who are not their natural or formal adoptive parents. The adult
39
parent surrogates many [sic] or may not be related to the children.”
Although informal adoption no doubt exists within all racial and
40
cultural communities, social science, as well as the United States
Census Bureau, have noted that the practice is particularly more
prevalent in the African American and the Hispanic American
41
communities. Given that these two minority populations account
42
for almost thirty percent of the United States population, it is first
necessary, prior to there being any hope of creating an inheritance
scheme that is more responsive to the children of these
communities, that the law have a thorough understanding of the
roles that both the extended family model and the practice of
informal adoption play within these communities.
A.

Informal Adoption Within the African American Family

As noted by Sociology Professor Shirley A. Hill, “the social
construction of the ideal family as a two-parent nuclear unit with a
37. Karen March, Perception of Adoption as Social Stigma: Motivation for
Search and Reunion, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 653, 653 (1995) (“[M]any racial
and ethnic groups in North America use the informal adoption practices of their
traditional cultures . . . .”).
38. TOM GILLES & JOE KROLL, N. AM. COUNCIL ON ADOPTABLE CHILDREN,
BARRIERS TO SAME RACE PLACEMENT 14 (1991).
39. ROBERT B. HILL, NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE RESEARCH DEP’T, INFORMAL
ADOPTION AMONG BLACK FAMILIES 9 (1977); see also Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics
on Adoption in the United States, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 26, 28–29 (1993)
(defining informal adoption as “when the birthmother allows another person (or
persons), usually another family member, to take parental responsibility for her
child without obtaining legal approval or recognition of that arrangement”).
40. Furthermore, different commentators looking at different cultures have
referred to the practice of informal adoption differently. Indeed, synonyms for
the practice of informally adopting a child include: “fostering,” “giving,”
“schooling-out,” “child-switching,” “child-loaning,” “child-keeping,” and
“adoptive fostering.” See Arvilla C. Payne-Price, Etic Variations on Fosterage
and Adoption, 54 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 134, 135 (1981).
41. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
42. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Minority Population Tops 100
Million (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/population/010048.html [hereinafter Minority
Population Press Release].
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breadwinner father and a homemaker mother . . . was never a
43
tradition among Black families.” Instead, for the African American
44
community, “family and household are not the same thing” with
“family” encompassing not only the members of a particular
45
household, but also “key persons living in separate households.” In
fact, studies show that the extended family model exists in twenty46
five to eighty-five percent of African American families.
Not
surprisingly, one finds a very similar family model existing in West
47
Africa, the location from which most American slaves were taken.
Indeed, “[t]he African immediate family, consisting of a father, his
wives, and their children, is but a part of a larger unit. This
immediate family is generally recognized by Africanists as belonging

43. Shirley A. Hill, Class, Race, and Gender Dimensions of Child Rearing in
African American Families, 31 J. BLACK STUD. 494, 495–96 (2001).
44. Niara Sudarkasa, African American Families and Family Values, in
BLACK FAMILIES 9, 20 (Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 3d ed. 1997); see also
ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB’S LADDER: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES 31–32 (1992) (“[I]n our definition of AfricanAmerican family organization, people do not have to live in the same household
in order to function as a family unit.”).
45. ROBERT B. HILL ET AL., RESEARCH ON THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY: A
HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE 104 (1993) [hereinafter HILL, HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE]; see
also McConnell, supra note 24, at 52 (noting that, within the African American
community, “genetic family is recognized but not elevated over other types of
extended biological and nonbiological family relationships”).
46. Melvin N. Wilson & Timothy F. J. Tolson, Familial Support in the
Black Community, 19 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 347, 347 (1990); see also
Rubye W. Beck & Scott H. Beck, The Incidence of Extended Households Among
Middle-Aged Black and White Women, 10 J. FAM. ISSUES 147, 150 (1989)
(“Cross-sectional evidence indicates that black kin are more likely to share a
residence than are white kin.”). However, it should be noted that, given that
the African American definition of “family” often extends beyond a single
household, it is difficult to know what percentage of African Americans live in
an extended family versus a nuclear family model. See Jacqueline Marie Smith,
The Demography of African American Families and Children at the End of the
Twentieth Century, in CHILD WELFARE REVISITED: AN AFRICENTRIC PERSPECTIVE
15, 23 (Joyce E. Everett et al. eds., 2004). Nonetheless, statistics do reveal that,
between 1970 and 1980, the percentage of African Americans living in an
extended family household rose from twenty-three to twenty-eight percent,
while the same statistic remained at eleven percent for whites. HILL ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 102. Of course, as these statistics demonstrate, not all African
American families fall into the extended family model. Indeed, as at least one
commentator has noted, “a large number of African-American families function
along nuclear lines.” NANCY BOYD-FRANKLIN, BLACK FAMILIES IN THERAPY:
UNDERSTANDING THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 54 (2d ed. 2003).
Nonetheless, as Boyd-Franklin points out, even those households often “are
active in their extended families.” Id.
47. Sudarkasa, supra note 44, at 10–11.
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to a local relationship group termed the ‘extended family.’”
Additionally, the costs of child rearing in the extended family model
of West Africa are “rarely born exclusively by biological parents;
rather, they are shared by many people through the extended family
49
and other social networks.”
Furthermore, in marked contrast to the nuclear family model,
in both African and African American culture, it is consanguinity,
50
and not conjugality, that most generally defines “family.” As noted
anthropologist Dr. Niara Sudarkasa explains:
African extended families were (and are) large
multigenerational groupings of relatives built around a core
group known as a lineage. Members of this group of “blood
relatives” trace their descent from a common male ancestor
through a line of males in some societies, such as the Yoruba of
Nigeria, or from a female ancestor through a line of females, in
societies such as the Ashanti of Ghana . . . .
Because lineage members were and are prohibited from
marrying one another, they must take their spouses from other
lineages. In this way, extended families are created.51

However, even then, the notion of “family” within African
American culture frequently transcends both marriage and
bloodline. In fact, one of the hallmarks of African American families
is the concept of collective unity that manifests itself in several
forms of extended family kinships. Professor Connie M. Kane
provides two examples:
One is the three-generation household, a structure that allows
for pooling financial and human resources for the care of
children and the elderly, as well as for the emotional support
of parents. Another is that of family members choosing to live
in separate households but close proximity to each other, so
that daily interaction is not only possible but likely. And a
48. HILL ET AL., supra note 45, at 105 (quoting MELVIN J. HERSKOVITS, THE
MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST 182 (Beacon Paperback 1958)); see also Sudarkasa,
supra note 44, at 13–19.
49. Hegar & Scannapieco, supra note 36, at 155.
50. BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 28 (“Blood ties or lineage constitute the
strongest element in the African-American kinship system.”); Niara Sudarkasa,
Interpreting the African Heritage in Afro-American Family Organization, in
BLACK FAMILIES 37, 42 (Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 2d ed. 1981) (“The most
far-reaching difference between African and European families stems from their
differential emphasis on consanguinity and conjugality . . . . In Africa, unlike
Europe, in many critical areas of family life the consanguineal core group rather
than the conjugal pair was paramount.”).
51. Sudarkasa, supra note 44, at 14.
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third structure quite common in African American
communities is that of fictive kin. Here, families establish
familial relationships with people who are not related by blood
and who may or may not live with the nuclear family. Friends
or neighbors are likely candidates for fictive kin relationships
and may be given kinship titles, such as aunt or uncle.52

Despite these different forms, the key benefit underlying the
extended family model within the African American community is
53
the same: survival.
In fact, many scholars credit the extended
family as “the institution most responsible for the survival of
54
African people in the United States.”
Specifically, the extended
family model employs a “collectivistic philosophy,” in which the
individual members focus not on individual needs, but on the needs
of the collective so as to ultimately benefit the greater African
55
American community. One example of this mutual support can be
found in the practice of “othermothers,” a term used to describe
African American women who provide both extended and sometimes
56
permanent child care to the children of friends and relatives.
Of course, given the rather large obstacles that African
Americans have historically faced, this need for survival may not be
so easy for others to comprehend. As Nancy Boyd-Franklin notes,
“[i]t is often difficult for those raised within a purely Westernized
system focused on the individual and the nuclear family to
understand a worldview that places the well-being of the social
57
whole before that of its members.”
For those who may have
difficulty understanding the worldview that Boyd-Franklin points
to, they need only consider two obstacles that have made the
extended family model almost indispensable to African Americans.
Although many such obstacles persist today, the two that are most
relevant here are slavery and this country’s history of
discriminatory child welfare practices. Given that African American
families have managed to triumph over both, the success of the
52. Connie M. Kane, African American Family Dynamics as Perceived by
Family Members, 30 J. BLACK STUD. 691, 692–93 (2000) (citations omitted).
53. BOYD-FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 6 (“[S]urvival skills are among the
most significant strengths of African American families today.”); see also STACK,
supra note 30, at 28 (noting the “strategies for survival” emanating from the
“extensive networks of kin and friends” in the African American community).
54. Sudarkasa, supra note 44, at 12; see also HILL, supra note 39, at 29
(“The institution primarily responsible for the survival and advancement of
black people from slavery to present times has been the extended family.”).
55. BOYD-FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 6.
56. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 271
(1995) (“It is not uncommon for a Black child’s “Mama” to be a woman who did
not give birth to her or who is not even related to her by blood.”).
57. BOYD-FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 6.
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extended family model cannot be overstated.
As a preliminary matter, in terms of American slavery, some
sociologists, taking the “ethnocentric” view, posit that slavery
58
destroyed all remnants of African culture. Others, however, take
the “cultural relativistic” view and find that “the history and the
heritage of the African-American people does not begin or end with
slavery. It goes far back into ancient Africa, back to the origins of
59
all humankind and the rise of civilization.” As noted earlier, the
extended family network constitutes one of the key characteristics of
60
West African culture. Thus, cultural relativists would argue that
the extended family network that exists today in African American
61
culture can be traced back to West Africa. However, regardless of
whether the first African Americans brought extended family
networks with them to the United States, many historians have
noted how slavery actually created more incentives to extend the
notion of the family beyond nuclear boundaries and into the larger
62
community.
Indeed, given the challenges that enslaved African American
63
families faced, the extended family model was crucial. As one legal
scholar has noted, “[f]rom the beginning of the importation of
Africans to the Americas, Black families have been subject to
systematic and institutional and individual deprivation and
degradation, resulting in the tearing of their social and familial
64
order.”
Particularly vulnerable were slave children, who were
65
frequently separated from their parents.
Faced with so many

58. See BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 83; see also Jualynne Elizabeth
Dodson, Conceptualizations of African American Families, in BLACK FAMILIES,
supra note 44, at 67, 67–73.
59. BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 83–84. “There is a distinct nexus
between Africa and America, which, though broken and perverted, is
nevertheless not to be neglected.” Mark Fine et al., Family Stability in Black
Families: Values Underlying Three Different Perspectives, 18 J. COMP. FAM.
STUD. 1, 12 (1987) (quoting W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE NEGRO AMERICAN FAMILY 9
(1908)).
60. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
61. See Dodson, supra note 58, at 73–76 (discussing the cultural relativistic
view).
62. See, e.g., Sudarkasa, supra note 44, at 18–19 (noting the importance of
kinship networks on and across plantations).
63. See Roberts, supra note 56, at 269 (“Because families could be torn
asunder at the slavemaster’s whim, slave communities created networks of
mutual obligation that reached beyond the nuclear family related by blood and
marriage.”).
64. Holmes, supra note 25, at 1661.
65. John Hope Franklin, African American Families: A Historical Note, in
BLACK FAMILIES, supra note 44, at 5, 5–6.
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children in need of a family, the extended family model with its
“flexible boundaries where outside members can be subsumed into
66
67
the formally defined family” became particularly crucial.
Specifically, one of the most effective ways in which the
extended family model contributed to the survival of African
Americans during slavery was through the practice of informal
68
adoption. As noted by Robert B. Hill in his book Informal Adoption
Among Black Families, “one of the key functions performed by the
black extended family is the informal adoption or foster care of
69
children by grandparents, aunts and uncles and other kin.” Thus,
slave children left without parents would be informally adopted by
other members of the slave community. According to Hill, “during
slavery, the practice of informal adoption of children by
grandparents and aunts and uncles permitted thousands of black
children to withstand the ordeals of slavery -- [sic] after their
70
parents had often been sold as chattel.”
Unfortunately, even after slavery had been abolished, African
American families continued to face challenges that would further
underscore the need for the extended family network and informal
adoptions. Specifically, African American families were generally
excluded from the child welfare programs that existed following the
71
end of slavery. In fact, at the 1930 White House Conference on
Child Health and Protection of Dependent and Neglected Children,
Dr. Ira De A. Reid presented data outlining the discriminatory
treatment that African American families were receiving in foster
72
and child care. The data showed that 1) African American families
were at best underrepresented and, at worst, completely excluded

66. G. Susan Mosley-Howard & Cheryl Burgan Evans, Relationships and
Contemporary Experiences of the African American Family: An Ethnographic
Case Study, 30 J. BLACK STUD. 428, 431 (2000).
67. See McConnell, supra note 24, at 52 (“[S]lavery . . . forced the creation
of systems of mutal support beyond the traditional nuclear family.”).
68. See Ruth G. McRoy, African American Adoptions, in CHILD WELFARE
REVISITED, supra note 46, at 256, 260 (“During slavery, the community’s
response to the disruption of family bonds was to absorb children left without
parents into existing family networks.”).
69. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at iv.
70. Id. at 22; see also Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 592–93.
71. See McRoy, supra note 68, at 260; see also ANDREW BILLINGSLEY &
JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI, CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND
AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 58 (1972) (describing the “cruel and fateful years just
after emancipation, when Black people were largely deserted by the wider
society”); Franklin, supra note 65, at 8.
72. See BILLINGSLEY & GIOVANNONI, supra note 71, at 81–85; see also Robert
B. Hill, Institutional Racism in Child Welfare, in CHILD WELFARE REVISITED,
supra note 46, at 57, 60 [hereinafter Hill, Institutional Racism].
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from the Mother’s Aid program (a precursor to AFDC and TANF); 2)
despite the higher rates of illegitimacy that existed among African
Americans, facilities that were designed to care for illegitimate
children and their unwed mothers were almost exclusively for
whites; and 3) most health care services existed mainly to serve
whites, despite the high level of infant mortality that existed among
73
African Americans at the time. Furthermore, during segregation,
African American children were excluded from most adoption
74
agencies. In light of this discrimination, it was the extended family
that “came to the rescue of thousands of related and non-related
75
African American children who had no means of support.” Once
again, this rescue was frequently achieved through the practice of
76
informal adoption.
Even today, despite the greater availability of child welfare
services to African American families, the extended-family model
continues to serve a pronounced role within the African American
77
community. To explain this continuation of the extended family,
some commentators have offered that “poverty, racism, and
socioeconomic and psychological stressors have necessitated the
continuation of the pattern of extended family as a buffer against
78
negative external forces.”
Furthermore, just as the extended
family model continues to survive within the African American
79
community, so too does the practice of informal adoption.
73. BILLINGSLEY & GIOVANNONI, supra note 71, at 81–85.
74. BOYD-FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 63.
75. McRoy, supra note 68, at 260 (citation omitted).
76. Id.; see also BOYD-FRANKLIN, supra note 46, at 63 (noting that “the
kinship care and informal adoption process provided an unofficial social service
network for African American families and children”).
77. See Hill, Institutional Racism, supra note 72, at 60 (“Although much
higher proportions of African American children and families are currently
represented in [child welfare] programs, the services are still inaccessible or
inadequate for the large numbers of low-income families that need them.”)
78. McRoy, supra note 68, at 260. Some critics note the continued presence
of racism in the current child welfare system of today. See Oronde A. Miller &
Rebecca Jones Gaston, A Model of Culture-Centered Child Welfare Practice, 82
CHILD WELFARE 235, 236 (2003) (describing the “cultural arrogance of the
American child welfare system”).
79. See Stolley, supra note 39, at 29 (describing the contemporary practice
of informal adoption as “widespread”). In fact, it is not uncommon to see
contemporary African American scholars include the informally adopted when
defining “family.” For example, in his book Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The
Enduring Legacy of African American Families, Andrew Billingsley provides
the following:
What do we mean by “African American family”? Essentially, it is an
intimate association of persons of African descent who are related to
one another by a variety of means, including blood, marriage, formal
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Specifically, in regards to the extended family, statistics show
that, in 1996, 23% of African American children lived in extended
80
families, compared with only 10% of white children. Furthermore,
one finds even greater differences between the races when looking at
the treatment of children who are born out of wedlock. Specifically,
Hill notes that, as late as 1977, 90% of African American children
born out of wedlock were retained by the extended family, in
contrast with only 7% of nonmarital white children whom are more
81
likely to be put up for adoption. Additionally, an African American
child is four and a half times as likely as a white child to live with
82
neither parent.
For instance, according to the U.S. Census, in
2001, 9.56% of African American children lived apart from both
83
84
parents. For white children, the percentage was only 3%. This
statistic is important because, in considering the rate of informal
adoption, an African American child who does not live with either
parent has a much greater chance of being informally adopted. In
fact, Robert B. Hill has noted that 80% of African American children
85
not living with either parent are informally adopted. Furthermore,
statistics reveal that the number of African American children who
live with and have been informally adopted by relatives rose from
86
1.3 to 1.4 million between 1970 and 1979. By 1990, the number
87
had reached 1.6 million. In total, it has been estimated that nearly
88
15% of African American children are informally adopted.
adoption, informal adoption, or by appropriation; sustained by a
history of common residence in America; and deeply embedded in a
network of social structures both internal and external to itself.
Numerous interlocking elements come together, forming an
extraordinarily resilient institution.
BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 28.
80. Smith, supra note 46, at 23–24.
81. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at 23.
82. Marian Wright Edelman, An Advocacy Agenda for Black Families and
Children, in BLACK FAMILIES, supra note 44, at 323, 324.
83. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18
YEARS AND MARITAL STATUS OF PARENTS, BY AGE, GENDER, RACE, AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN OF THE CHILD FOR ALL CHILDREN tbl.C3 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2001/tabC3-black.pdf.
84. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIPS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, HISPANIC
ORIGIN, AND METROPOLITAN RESIDENCE tbl.C2 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2001/tabC2-white.pdf.
85. Hill, Institutional Racism, supra note 72, at 69.
86. HILL, HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 45, at 32.
87. ROBERT B. HILL, THE STRENGTHS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER 126 (1999) [hereinafter HILL, AFRICAN AMERICAN
FAMILIES].
88. BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 30. Of course, despite the relatively
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In looking at African American households in which an informal
adoption has taken place, scholars have noted certain patterns in
terms of who is doing the “adopting.” First, it should be noted that
African Americans who are most likely to informally adopt are
unmarried, older, less educated, and living on a low or fixed
89
income.
Furthermore, it is grandparents, and generally
grandmothers, who play one of the most active roles in the practice
90
of informal adoption within the African American community.
Specifically, Hill notes that for those children who were informally
adopted before age six, two-thirds were informally adopted by
91
grandparents.
Additionally, studies have also shown that a
disproportionate number of African American children are reared by
92
elderly African American women. In fact, statistics reveal that one
in three African American families containing young children are

high incidence of informal adoption, the African American community is in no
way adverse to the practice of formal adoption. In fact, a survey by the
National Urban League African American Pulse Survey found that, among
African American households, one-third were interested in formally adopting.
McRoy, supra note 68, at 261. Furthermore, as Andrew Billingsley points out,
“[w]hile it is not generally reported, middle-income African-American families
adopt children at a higher rate than their white counterparts.” BILLINGSLEY,
supra note 44, at 29. For a discussion of the barriers faced by the African
American community when it comes to formal adoption, see Charmaine Yoest,
Points of Light: Informal Adoption in the Black Community, 19 CHILDREN
TODAY 8, 9–10 (1990). One of those barriers is actually a cultural bias within
the African American community against formal adoption. In fact, one study
found that eighty-nine percent of the single African American mothers surveyed
“felt that if they had chosen formal adoption, they would receive significant
negative feedback from their peers and community.” Id. at 9.
89. Hill, Institutional Racism, supra note 72, at 69; see also, HILL,
INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at 60 (noting the “disproportionate lowincome status of informally adopted children”). For a discussion of whether
poverty contributes to the present continuation of the extended family model
within the African American community, see Harriette Pipes McAdoo, Patterns
of Upward Mobility in Black Families, in BLACK FAMILIES, supra note 50, at
155.
90. BILLINGSLEY, supra note 44, at 30–31 (“Grandparents continue to be the
primary agents of informal adoption.”); HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note
39, at 44–45. For a discussion of the benefits associated with the active role that
grandmothers play in the extended family model, see Wilson & Tolson, supra
note 46, at 349.
91. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at 45. Additionally, “AfricanAmerican students are more likely than White students to describe their
grandparents as ‘surrogate parent[s].’” Maldonado, supra note 29, at 909.
92. Maldonado, supra note 29, at 903 (“African-American children are more
than twice as likely as White children to live with their grandparents. Not
surprisingly, African-American women have a 60% likelihood of living with
their grandchildren in an extended family at some point . . . .”).
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headed by women who are sixty-five years or older, compared with
93
one in ten white families.
After grandparents, it is aunts and
94
uncles who most often informally adopt. Finally, Hill notes that
“about 12 percent of the black children who were informally adopted
95
in families were not relatives of the heads of household.”
Although scant, there are also some statistics relating to the age
at which African American children are most likely to be informally
adopted. First, African American children are typically taken in at
96
very early ages. This statistic is not that surprising given that one
of the circumstances that typically leads to an informal adoption is
97
the “immaturity” of the birth mother. Nonetheless, regardless of
the age at which African American children are taken in for
informal adoption, Hill noted in his study of informal adoptions
within African American families that “the majority of informally
adopted children being reared today are in fact school-age and would
be considered at an age that was ‘hard to place’ for formal
98
adoption.”
Finally, it is important to note that, when it comes to informal
adoptions within African American extended families, these
99
arrangements rarely involve any formal agreement. Furthermore,
even though these kinship placements may start out as temporary,
100
they frequently become permanent.

93. Mosley-Howard & Evans, supra note 66, at 432; see also Hegar &
Scannapieco, supra note 36, at 157 (“African-American children make up fortyfour percent of those living with grandparents without a parent in the home[,
which] is about six times more common for African-American children . . . than
it is for white . . . children.” (citations omitted)). As others have pointed out, it
is not surprising that grandparents play a larger role in parenting in the
African American community given that African American mothers, along with
Latinas, “are generally younger, poorer, and less likely than other women to be
married when they bear children.” Maldonado, supra note 29, at 906.
94. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at 45.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Id. at 46; Wilson & Tolson, supra note 46, at 349; see also Melvin N.
Wilson, The Context of the African American Family, in CHILD WELFARE: AN
AFRICENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 85, 101–02 (Joyce E. Everett et al. eds., 1991) (noting
that, along with the immaturity of the biological mother, other circumstances
contributing to informal adoption include “death or illness of the child’s parents;
separation or divorce of the parents; . . . proximity of a relative to particular
school . . . [and] personal needs of the adopter”).
98. HILL, INFORMAL ADOPTION, supra note 39, at 42.
99. Wilson, supra note 97, at 102; Wilson & Tolson, supra note 46, at 349.
100. Wilson, supra note 97, at 102; Wilson & Tolson, supra note 46, at 349.
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Informal Adoption Within the Hispanic Family

In 2003, history was made when the U.S. Census Bureau
announced that the nation’s Hispanic population had officially
surpassed the African American population to become the nation’s
101
largest minority group.
Not only has the Hispanic community
retained that title, but it also continues to be the nation’s fastest102
growing minority community. In fact, between 2005 and 2006, the
Hispanic population in the United States increased by 3.4%,
compared with a 1.3% increase in the African American
103
population.
Overall, it is estimated that there are 44.3 million
104
Hispanics living in the United States today.
Of course, one must
be careful to note that the term “Hispanic” is merely a blanket term
that encompasses a number of individuals from various regions and
105
cultures. In defining this community more specifically, a report on
the 2000 Census showed that 58.5% of the nation’s Hispanic
population identified as Mexican, 9.6% identified as Puerto Rican,
3.5% as Cuban, and the balance as “Other Hispanic,” which includes
106
Spanish, Dominican, and Central and South American.
Not surprisingly, within this heterogeneous group, there exist
107
“different histories, traditions and beliefs.”
One of the central
traditions with numerous variations within the larger Hispanic

101. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Reaches AllTime High of 38.8 Million, New Census Bureau Estimates Show (June 18,
2003), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2003/cb03100.html.
102. Minority Population Press Release, supra note 42.
103. Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS
2000 BRIEF 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr013.pdf [hereinafter HISPANIC POPULATION 2000 BRIEF] (noting that the Hispanic
population increased 57.9% from 1990 to 2000).
104. Minority Population Press Release, supra note 42.
105. See MICHAEL BENJAMIN, CULTURAL DIVERSITY, EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 53 (1996); Berta Esperanza
Hernandez-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit Possibilities:
Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 815 (1999) (noting “the
panethnic groups collectively catalogued under the umbrella of the Latina/o
label”).
106. See HISPANIC POPULATION 2000 BRIEF, supra note 103, at 2 & fig.2; see
also BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 53 (listing those of Mexican origin as
comprising 62% of the U.S. Hispanic population; Puerto Rican, 13%; and Cuban,
5%).
107. BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 53; see also Bron B. Ingoldsby, Poverty
and Patriarchy in Latin American, in FAMILIES IN MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 19, at 335, 335 (“It is not possible to make accurate generalizations
about an area as large and diverse as Latin America.”).
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As sociologist Alfredo
community is the role of the family.
Mirandé notes, “[j]ust as there is no one uniform Anglo-American
family, so there is no one [Hispanic] family but a number of family
types that vary according to region, recentness of migration to the
109
United States, education, social class, age, and urban-rural locale.”
Nonetheless, within the Hispanic community, there are a number of
key family characteristics that, although perhaps not universal, do
110
exist across the various subgroups.
One of those characteristics,
and the one most relevant to the discussion here, is “a strong,
111
112
persistent familistic orientation,”
or “familism,”
within the
113
Hispanic community.
Similar to the African American community, “the
multigenerational, informal extended family” is the basic family
114
unit within the Hispanic community.
This model is comprised of
not only the traditional nuclear family, but also “highly integrated
115
extended kinship systems” including both primary kin, such as
parents and siblings, and secondary kin, which would include aunts,
116
uncles, cousins, and grandparents.
Furthermore, it is not
uncommon in the Hispanic community for the extended family to
117
include even close friends and neighbors.
Thus, like the African

108. See Note, Into the Mouths of Babes: La Familia Latina and Federally
Funded Child Welfare, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1992) [hereinafter La
Familia Latina] (“There is no one ‘Latino culture,’ nor one definitive Latino
family pattern in the United States.”).
109. ALFREDO MIRANDÉ, THE CHICANO EXPERIENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 153 (1985).
110. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 105, at 815 (noting that many of the
“cultural commonalities” within the Hispanic community “converge around the
importance of family”).
111. Oscar Ramírez & Carlos H. Árce, The Contemporary Chicano Family:
An Empirically Based Review, in EXPLORATIONS IN CHICANO PSYCHOLOGY 3, 15
(Augustine Barón Jr. ed., 1981).
112. Robert S. Bausch & Richard T. Serpe, Recruiting Mexican American
Adoptive Parents, 78 CHILD WELFARE 693, 701 (1999) (defining “familism” as
“the strong affective attachment to one’s extended family”).
113. MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 153 (“Probably the most significant
characteristic of the Chicano family is its strong emphasis on familism.”);
Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 105, at 816 (“La familia is of sacrosanct
importance in the cultura Latina.”).
114. BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 56.
115. Ramírez & Árce, supra note 111, at 15.
116. Id. at 16 (defining and distinguishing primary and secondary kin); see
also La Familia Latina, supra note 108, at 1322 (“[F]amilia encompasses broad,
extended family ties including many generations of aunts, uncles,
grandparents, and cousins.”).
117. As Professor Mirandé notes, within the Hispanic community, there is
little distinction between friends and relatives. “Not only are relatives included
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American community, members of the Hispanic community view
family and household as two distinct terms. In fact, so entrenched is
this distinction in the Hispanic community that it is even reflected
in the Spanish language:
In Spanish, the denotation of the term familia is generic.
Familia can embrace all extended family kin and single or
various combinations of individual households. Thus, when
speaking Spanish, one is usually careful to make a distinction
between a reference to extended family members or
households at large (familia always) and a reference to
members of the immediate household (la casa—“house” or
“home”), which is ordinarily a nuclear-family centered
dwelling.118

However, despite this distinction between family and
household, it is not uncommon for a Hispanic household to contain
more members of the extended family than would typically be found
in a nuclear family household. For example, within the Hispanic
community, it is not unusual for several generations to live in the
119
same household.
Furthermore, the extended-family model differs from the
nuclear-family model, not only in who counts as “family,” but also in
the high degree of closeness between those family members. For
example, children in Hispanic families typically develop “close bonds
not only with members of the immediate family but with
120
grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, and family friends.” As a
result, those reared in a nuclear-family model may have some
difficulty relating to the close and cohesive role that the extended
121
family plays within the Hispanic community.
For example, as
anthropologist Susan Emley Keefe points out:
For Mexican Americans it is important to see relatives
regularly face-to-face, to embrace, to touch, and to simply be
with one another, sharing the minor joys and sorrows of daily
as friends but friends are symbolically incorporated into the family.” MIRANDÉ,
supra note 109, at 155; see also Failinger, supra note 17, at 234–35 (noting the
inclusion of “close friends and neighbors” in Mexican American families).
118. Jaime Sena-Rivera, Extended Kinship in the United States: Competing
Models and the Case of La Familia Chicana, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 121, 123
(1979); see also MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 157 (“[F]or Chicanos, the
distinction between casa (household) and familia (relatives) is significant.”).
119. See MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 153 (quoting RUTH D. TUCK, NOT WITH
THE FIST: MEXICAN AMERICANS IN A SOUTHWEST CITY 122 (1946)); La Familia
Latina, supra note 108, at 1322.
120. MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 153.
121. BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 59 (“[B]y comparison with Whites,
Hispanic kinship systems are extraordinarily close and cohesive.”).
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life. For Anglos, these things are integral to nuclear family life
122
but less important with regard to extended family ties.

This close network of kin operates to promote “economic
123
assistance, encouragement, and support” among its members. The
role of the family is so strong within the Hispanic community that
the family is often placed ahead of the individuals who constitute it
and “includes many responsibilities and obligations to immediate
124
family members and other kin.” In this sense, the extended family
125
within the Hispanic community works as “a problem-solving unit.”
As Professors Patterson and Marsiglia note, “[t]he greater kincenteredness of Mexican American families as opposed to the strong
ethos of independence common among European American families,
may intensify the natural helping processes and outcomes among
126
Latinos.”
Other commentators have also pointed to Hispanic
families as exceeding white families in terms of the help and support
127
that members provide to one another.
In many ways, this interfamily support has been necessary to
the advancement of the Hispanic community within the United
States. Just as the extended family made it easier for African
Americans to weather the challenges of slavery and discriminatory
128
child-welfare policies, so too has this family model enabled the
Hispanic community to combat the unique difficulties that it has
129
faced in this country. This benefit does not suggest, however, that
the extended-family model among the Hispanic community is

122. Susan Emley Keefe, Real and Ideal Extended Familism Among Mexican
Americans and Anglo Americans: On the Meaning of “Close” Family Ties, 43
HUM. ORG. 65, 68 (1984).
123. See Shirley L. Patterson & Flavio Francisco Marsiglia, “Mi Casa Es Su
Casa”: Beginning Exploration of Mexican Americans’ Natural Helping, 81
FAMILIES SOC’Y 22, 24 (2000).
124. Ingoldsby, supra note 107, at 337.
125. Patterson & Marsiglia, supra note 123, at 24; see also Rosina M.
Becerra, The Mexican-American Family, in ETHNIC FAMILIES IN AMERICA:
PATTERNS AND VARIATIONS 153, 161 (Charles H. Mindel et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)
(“The family is a major support system, a unit to which the individual may turn
for help when in stress or in other types of need.”).
126. Patterson & Marsiglia, supra note 123, at 24.
127. E.g., Ingoldsby, supra note 107, at 337 (“In many ways, the Hispanic
family helps and supports its members to a degree far beyond that found in
individualistically oriented Anglo families.”).
128. See supra notes 63–76 and accompanying text.
129. See generally Bonnie Thornton Dill, Fictive Kin, Paper Sons, and
Compadrazgo: Women of Color and the Struggle for Family Survival, in WOMEN
OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY 149, 158–64 (Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie Thornton
Dill eds., 1994) (explaining how the extended family has helped the Hispanic
community combat difficulties it has faced in the United States).
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entirely a product of that community’s American experience. Social
scientists debate the extent to which the contemporary prevalence of
the extended-family model within the Hispanic community is a
result of external cultural forces as opposed to internal forces such
130
as adaptation and survival.
However, studies show that the
extended-family model exists not just in the Hispanic community
131
within the United States, but throughout Latin America.
Nonetheless, in focusing on the internal forces that promote a
continued adherence to the extended-family model within the
Hispanic community, social scientists have identified two such
forces. First, the extended family has helped Hispanic Americans
132
deal with the challenge of poverty.
Although poverty afflicts
members of all races in the United States, “[t]he Latino family
experiences more severe financial burdens than the white American
133
family.”
White Americans on average have a household income
134
that is 41% higher than that of the average Hispanic family.
Furthermore, families headed by single mothers constitute the
135
majority of the poor in the United States.
Among these single136
mother households, 45% are African American or Hispanic.
130. See Ramírez & Árce, supra note 111, at 11 (noting the lack of consensus
on “whether the Chicano extended family is primarily a cultural holdover or
primarily a functional adaptation”); Maxine Baca Zinn, Familism Among
Chicanos: A Theoretical Review, 10 HUMBOLDT J. SOC. REL. 224, 229 (1982)
(noting the tension between the internal and external forces that may have
shaped the contemporary role that familism plays in the Hispanic community).
131. RUTH D.TUCK, NOT WITH THE FIST: MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN A SOUTHWEST
CITY 122 (1946) (“In Latin America, the family includes not only parents and
children, but an extended circle of relatives as well.”); Zinn, supra note 130, at
228; see also Becerra, supra note 125, at 158 (discussing how the “traditional
structure of the Mexican family grew out of the socioeconomic needs dictated by
the agrarian and craft economies of Mexico”).
132. See Marta Tienda & Ronald Angel, Headship and Household
Composition Among Blacks, Hispanics, and Other Whites, 61 SOC. FORCES 508,
511 (1982) (arguing that the greater prevalence of the extended family model
within the Hispanic community is at least partially attributable to economic
disadvantage).
133. La Familia Latina, supra note 108, at 1323.
134. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 5, 8 tbl.2
(2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf.
135. McConnell, supra note 24, at 55 (citing JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL
HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN
AMERICA 17 (1991)).
136. Id. (noting that African American and Latina single-woman headed
households make up 55% of those households who receive public assistance); see
also Vilma Ortiz, Women of Color: A Demographic Overview, in WOMEN OF
COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY, supra note 129, at 13, 33 (noting that some racial-ethnic
groups, including Mexican and Puerto Rican, have higher poverty rates among
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Accordingly, some commentators have pointed to familism as a
response to these “historical conditions of economic deprivation”
137
among the Hispanic community.
Second, scholars have noted a general underutilization of
138
governmental resources by the Hispanic community.
To
understand this point, one must first take into account that the
“history of Hispanics in North America is typically one of
139
migration.”
This fact is crucial given that research shows that
immigrants to the United States typically live in extended families
140
for the first ten years.
However, even at the end of that time
period, immigrants tend to live close to and rely heavily upon
141
extended family.
This finding seemingly stems from the fact that,
“[i]n times of stress or when problems arise, [Hispanic Americans]
typically [turn] to the family for help rather than to outside
142
agencies.”
To explain this underutilization of formal resources, scholars
143
have offered three rationales.
The first would simply be a lack of
awareness within the community as to the availability of these
144
resources.
A second rationale is what is referred to as “culture
conflict,” which simply refers to the inevitable difficulties that arise
145
when communicating with one from another culture.
Finally,
there is fear. As sociology professor Joan W. Moore explains:
Another set of reasons adduced for low utilization of formal
resources by Mexican Americans is that even the assistance
offered by the “helping agencies” is confounded by their
historical involvement with highly punitive agencies. Despite
female-headed households).
137. Zinn, supra note 130, at 231; see also Dill, supra note 129, at 164
(noting how the extended family network within the Hispanic community
provides “the potential for an exchange of services among poor people whose
income did not provide the basis for family subsistence”).
138. See, e.g., Joan W. Moore, Mexican Americans and Cities: A Study in
Migration and the Use of Formal Resources, 5 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 292 (1971).
139. BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 54.
140. McConnell, supra note 24, at 54.
141. Id.; see also Ramírez & Árce, supra note 111, at 15 (noting that, even
with acculturation, “familism, both in terms of values and behaviors, is at ‘the
core of a culture’ and is thus retained and maintained, while more superficial
cultural traits are discarded and forgotten by succeeding generations”).
142. MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 151–52; see also Patterson & Marsiglia,
supra note 123, at 24–25 (“The sense of not belonging that some Mexican
Americans feel may prompt them to seek help from the extended family instead
of requesting help from unfamiliar institutions.”).
143. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 138, at 294–95.
144. Id. at 295.
145. Id. at 294–95.
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their intent, government bureaucracies cannot be specific. The
provision of one kind of service, e.g. [sic] medical, may entail
intrusion into questions of citizenship, family status, and
financial problems in the process of establishing eligibility.
Fear of the agency (the result of recurrent experiences which
become part of the ethnic tradition) is thus suggested as a
reason for avoidance.146

Thus, regardless of whether the cause is ignorance, cultural
conflict, or fear, Mexican Americans tend to rely less on formal
resources like governmental benefits, and more on informal
resources like the extended family. Specifically, studies show that
members of the extended family can typically be counted on to
provide services like “temporary housing, personal advice, nursing
147
during times of illness, and emotional support.”
Even in the area
of child care, the extended family tends to provide the majority of
support. In fact, part of Hispanic culture is the tenet that children
148
are primarily cared for by the family.
Thus, Latinas who work
outside the home tend to rely, not on day care centers, but on family
149
members to provide child care.
Furthermore, in some instances, this reliance on the extended
family goes beyond daily child care to temporary child placement
and even informal adoption. In the area of temporary placement
within the Hispanic community, Michael Benjamin notes that “in
times of crisis, family boundaries are sufficiently flexible and the
norms of mutual support (confianza en confianza) sufficiently strong
150
to sanction child lending.”
This process of child lending has been
146. Id. at 295; see also Marc L. Berk & Claudia L. Schur, The Effect of Fear
on Access to Care Among Undocumented Latino Immigrants, 3 J. IMMIGRANT
HEALTH 151, 155 (2001) (concluding that “lack of documentation—and the fear
associated with it—is a powerful deterrent to people obtaining care they believe
they need”); David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP.
J.L. & POL’Y 45, 56 (2005).
147. Becerra, supra note 125, at 161; see also M. Jean Gilbert, Extended
Family Integration Among Second-Generation Mexican Americans, in FAMILY
AND MENTAL HEALTH IN THE MEXICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 25, 40 (J. Manuel
Casas & Susan E. Keefe eds., 1978) (categorizing the kinds of exchanges within
the Hispanic community as “basic exchange including financial gifts or loans
and the provision of shelter, and personal service exchange including labor,
babysitting, sickbed care, personal advice with problems, and transportation”).
148. See, e.g., CARMEN INOA VAZQUEZ, PARENTING WITH PRIDE: LATINO STYLE:
HOW TO HELP YOUR CHILD CHERISH YOUR CULTURAL VALUES AND SUCCEED IN
TODAY’S WORLD 163 (2004) (“According to the traditional way, employing
nannies and babysitters is frowned on . . . .”).
149. See La Familia Latina, supra note 108, at 1325.
150. BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 56–57; see also Nydia Garcia-Preto,
Puerto Rican Families, in ETHNICITY & FAMILY THERAPY 242, 245 (Monica
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described as “the easy and frequent transferring of excess children
from one nuclear family to another, within a structure of blood and
151
ritual kin.”
Of particular importance in this area is the godparent, or
compadrazgo. Among Mexican Americans, the compadrazgo is an
example of a fictive kinship in which there exists “a core relational
commitment between the child and sponsor as well as between the
152
sponsor and the child’s parents.”
Historically, compadres (or
godparents) “had a moral obligation to act as guardians, to provide
financial assistance in times of need, and to substitute in case of the
153
death of a parent.”
Today, although the original meaning has
evolved to rely less on the notion of substitute parentage, the
institution of compadrazgo custom nonetheless remains intact as a
154
social function with the Hispanic community.
Similar to the family’s role in providing extended child care, the
Hispanic community relies on the extended family when it comes to
adoption. As many social scientists have noted, among the Hispanic
community, there is a cultural predisposition against formal
155
adoption and toward informal adoption.
In fact, one study found
that when compared to African Americans and whites, Hispanic
156
women are much less likely to adopt a child.
This preference has
been attributed to a number of obstacles that Hispanic Americans
face when attempting formal adoption. In essence, these obstacles
have been broken into two categories: structural and cultural. First,
similar to the rationales that were discussed earlier concerning the

McGoldrick et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005) (“[T]ransferring children from one nuclear
family to another within the extended system in times of crisis is common
. . . .”).
151. J. Mayone Stycos, Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico, 17 AM. SOC. REV.
572, 577 (1952).
152. Woodhouse, supra note 19, at 592.
153. Dill, supra note 129, at 164; see also NORMA WILLIAMS, THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN FAMILY: TRADITION AND CHANGE 26–27 (1990) (noting that it is the
responsibility of the compadrazgo “to take care of the physical and spiritual
needs of the child in the event that the parents could not perform these
essential duties”).
154. MIRANDÉ, supra note 109, at 155. But see Stycos, supra note 151, at 578
(noting that although compadrazgo, as it exists in the United States, is “now an
empty ritual,” it is nonetheless “a living and vital part of social relations among
Puerto Ricans”).
155. See Maria Suarez Hamm, Latino Adoption Issues, in NAT’L COUNCIL FOR
ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK III, at 257, 257–58 (Connaught Marshner ed.,
1999) (noting the cultural bias against formal adoption); Baushe & Serpe, supra
note 112, at 701 (noting the “cultural preference for informal rather than formal
adoption”).
156. Stolley, supra note 39, at 37–38.
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underutilization of formal resources by Mexican Americans, there
are structural obstacles to formal adoption such as “lack of
157
information, financial resources, and bilingual workers.”
Also,
data suggests that the waiting time to adopt for Hispanics tends to
be longer than for whites, and also some agency criteria has the
158
effect of screening out minority families.
However, in addition to those structural obstacles to adoption,
cultural obstacles also come into play. One cultural obstacle is “the
threat that adoption represents to the masculinity of Latino
159
males” because adoption could be taken to mean either that the
natural father is incapable of providing for the child or that the
adopting father is infertile, two impressions that could undermine a
160
male’s machismo.
Another cultural obstacle is the strong sense of
161
familism, as discussed earlier, which includes the belief that the
162
family should take care of its own.
In fact, one study showed that
this belief was a “very important factor” for 36% of Hispanic couples
163
who chose not to adopt, and “somewhat important” for 22%.
The
final obstacle emerges from the simple fact that adoption has not
164
historically been practiced within the Latino culture.
As a result of these structural and cultural obstacles to formal
adoption, the rate of informal adoption among the Hispanic
community is relatively high. Although researchers have paid
relatively little attention to informal adoption within the Hispanic
community, the U.S. Census Bureau has noted that informal
adoptions are higher among the African American and Hispanic
165
communities.
Unfortunately, the only information available to

157. Bausch & Serpe, supra note 112, at 706.
158. Id. at 698.
159. Id. at 706.
160. See BENJAMIN, supra note 105, at 58 (“According to group norms, men
are obliged to protect and provide for their kith and kin.”); Bausch & Serpe,
supra note 112, at 701 (“For Mexican American males who uphold machismo
values, formal adoption may be unacceptable, particularly if issues of
subfecundity or infertility are involved.”); see also Judith L. Gibbons et al.,
Gender Attitudes Mediate Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Adoption in
Guatemala, 54 SEX ROLES 139, 142 (2006) (“[T]hose who hold machismo beliefs
have more negative beliefs about adoption.”).
161. See supra notes 111–27 and accompanying text.
162. Bausch & Serpe, supra note 112, at 706.
163. Id. at 707 tbl.3.
164. However, this is not to suggest that the practice of formal adoption did
not exist historically. See, e.g., Ann S. Blum, Public Welfare and Child
Circulation, Mexico City, 1877 to 1925, 23 J. FAM. HIST. 240 (1998) (discussing
the historic role that adoption policy and practices played in Mexico).
165. ROSE M. KRIEDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, at 3 (2003), available at www.census.gov/prod
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provide a more specific understanding of the practice is fairly
specific to the Puerto Rican community. For example, J. Mayone
Stycos, who studied the practice of informal adoption in Puerto Rico,
made the following observations:
At the death of the father or mother of a family, it is quite
usual in rural areas for the members to be dispersed to kin or
ritual kin, but such a family crisis is hardly needed for the
adoption of children. For example, a very young child may be
sent to live with a relative or friend who is better off
economically, or to live with grandparents who may be lonely.
The latter will informally adopt the child, feed and clothe it,
and in return may expect it to assist in the housework.166

Stycos also notes that these informal adoptions can last “from
167
months to life.”
Furthermore, in looking at those Puerto Rican
children who have been informally adopted (hijos de crianza),
Professor Melba Sanchez-Ayendez notes that these children “are
generally treated by their adoptive parents as though they were
their own and that their status within the household is like that of
the other children of the parents,” and that, even when no legal
adoption was involved, these children nonetheless “know that the
168
family and home of the adoptive parents is their own.”
Currently, more information is needed concerning the practice
of informal adoption within other subgroups comprising the
Hispanic community. Nonetheless, what is known regarding the
larger Hispanic community and what is particularly important for
purposes of this Article is that the Hispanic community, with its
emphasis and reliance on the extended family, frequently relies on
family when it comes to child care. As a result, given the cultural
predisposition against formal adoption, many children who cannot
be cared for by their natural parents are being informally adopted
by members of the extended family, who may or may not be
biologically related.

/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf.
166. Stycos, supra note 151, at 578 (citation omitted).
167. Id.
168. Melba Sánchez-Ayéndez, The Puerto Rican Family, in ETHNIC FAMILIES
IN AMERICA: PATTERNS AND VARIATIONS 199, 204 (Charles H. Mindel et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1998). Sánchez-Ayéndez further notes that “[t]he practice of informal
adoption still exists among Puerto Ricans in the United States.” Id. at 214.
However, she does concede that “[m]any of those Puerto Ricans who might
consider informally adopting a child opt for legal adoption to avoid emotional
suffering and legal consequences in the future.” Id.
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III. THE LAW OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Despite the prevalence of the extended family model within
these minority ethnic communities, the law of intestate succession
169
remains almost exclusively based on the nuclear-family model.
In
fact, historically one of the policies underlying intestacy has been
170
the promotion of the nuclear family.
As Lawrence M. Friedman
notes:
Rules of inheritance and succession are, in a way, the genetic
code of a society. They guarantee that the next generation
will, more or less, have the same structure as the one that
preceded it . . . . Rules favoring wives and children reinforce
the nuclear family. Any radical change in the rules, if carried
171
out, will radically change the society.

Indeed, the law of inheritance continues to cling to this policy
even as other areas of law have taken a more expansive view of the
172
various individuals who may constitute a “family.”
As one
commentator noted, “[a]t the dawn of the twenty-first century, the
inheritance system stands as one of the last bastions of the
173
traditional American family.”
Because of this disparity between
the intestate definition of family and other legal definitions of
family, individuals today may be somewhat surprised to learn
174
exactly who their “heirs” are for purposes of intestate succession.

169. Foster, supra note 2, at 201 (noting “the failure of inheritance law to
adapt to the changing American family”); Gary, supra note 2, at 4–5 (noting
that, with limited exceptions, “intestacy laws still reflect the nuclear family
norm”); Jennifer Seidman, Comment, Functional Families and Dysfunctional
Laws: Committed Partners and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211,
212 (2004) (pointing out the Uniform Probate Code’s adherence to “outmoded
assumptions inapplicable to many American families” and the corresponding
“absurd results”).
170. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 324.
171. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 9,
14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977).
172. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “[i]n many states, laws
such as wrongful death statutes, workers compensation laws, custody and
visitation statutes and housing statutes now include persons beyond legally
married spouses and legal children”).
173. Foster, supra note 2, at 200 (“Many of its rules and doctrines appear
frozen in time, remnants of a bygone era of nuclear families bound together by
lifelong affection and support.”).
174. See Ralph C. Brashier, Consanguinity, Sibling Relationships, and the
Default Rules of Inheritance Law: Reshaping Half-Blood Statutes to Reflect the
Evolving Family, 58 SMU L. REV. 137, 147 (2005) (“In truth, most people

W07-HIGDON.V2

6/28/2008 11:30:41 AM

2008] INFORMAL ADOPTION & INTESTATE SUCCESSION 251
For example, a survey by the American Bar Foundation asked
participants if they knew who would inherit their property in the
absence of a will. Although over 70% responded that they did know
who would inherit, only 44.6% could then accurately list the
relatives who would actually take under the governing intestate
175
statute.
Of course, the law of intestate succession was never designed to
perfectly delineate for each intestate decedent every individual that
176
the decedent would have considered to be his family.
Instead,
these laws merely seek to determine the presumed donative intent
177
of the average decedent.
In other words, the law of intestacy is
largely based on to whom the average person would likely have left
178
his property if that person had executed a will. Indeed, it was this
policy that motivated the intestacy scheme proposed by the drafters
of the Uniform Probate Code. “The Code attempts to reflect the
normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his property
179
at death.”
The rationale behind this attempt to conform the laws
of inheritance with general donative intent is that, without any
conformity, the intestacy scheme would effectively operate as “a trap
180
for the ignorant or misinformed.”

(including most lawyers whose practice does not include probate matters) do not
know precisely how their state intestacy statute would distribute their
property.”); Fellows et al., supra note 170, at 339 (noting evidence indicating
that “people who die intestate do not know how their property will be
distributed”); Gary, supra note 2, at 18 (noting studies that have revealed that
“actual knowledge of the intestate distributive scheme is limited”).
175. Fellows, supra note 170, at 339–40.
176. See Gary, supra note 2, at 1 (“An analysis of intestacy law must begin
with the recognition that an intestacy statute cannot work equally well for
every potential decedent.”); Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in
Inheritance Laws Through Judicial Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from
Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 451 (2003)
(pointing out that “the strict scheme of intestate succession cannot possibly
allow for every situation and every individual’s wishes”).
177. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 62; Susan N. Gary, The ParentChild Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 651 (2002)
(“Of course, intestacy statutes presume an intent and do not attempt to
determine a decedent’s actual intent.”); Holob, supra note 5, at 1499 (“[I]n
creating default rules, probate codes attempt to best approximate how most
testators dispose of their estate when dying with a valid will.”).
178. See Gary, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that the goal of recreating donative
intent is “[t]he most commonly identified goal of intestacy statutes”); Seidman,
supra note 169, at 211 (“Intestacy laws dictate succession of an intestate
decedent’s estate, aiming primarily to honor the presumed donative intent of
the decedent.”).
179. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. I, general cmt. (1974) (amended 1991).
180. Fellows, supra note 170, at 324.
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However, there are also other important policy concerns
underlying the laws of intestate succession. For instance, there is
the policy of crafting a system of inheritance that is “clear, simple,
181
and comprehensible,” so as to allow for the “ease of administration
182
of the probate system.”
For this reason, “American legislatures
have used objective rules to determine a survivor’s inclusion within
an intestacy provision,” so as to avoid a “messy inquiry into the
183
subjective quality of the survivor’s relationship with the decedent.”
The fear is that an intestate system requiring too much of an
individual inquiry would create too much of a burden for probate
courts and would also make it more difficult for individuals to
predict who would be their likely heirs under the intestacy statutes.
Another concern underlying the current intestate succession
system is the policy of ensuring that there is a fair distribution of
property among the decedent’s family so as to “not produce
disharmony within the surviving family members [n]or disdain for
184
the legal system.”
Finally, there is the goal of protecting the
185
financially dependent family.
As one commentator has noted,
“[p]rotection of financially dependent family members benefits not
only an intestate’s dependents . . ., but also other family members
and the public at large, upon whom the burden of supporting the
186
dependents would otherwise fall.”
With these underlying policies, most intestate schemes have an
initial preference for the surviving spouse, followed by surviving
children, then parents, then siblings, and then on to more remote
187
relations in the decedent’s bloodline.
If no “family” members
188
survive the decedent, then the estate will escheat to the state.

181. Cristy G. Lomenzo, Note, A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy
Provisions for Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 941, 945
(1995).
182. Gary, supra note 177, at 652.
183. Brashier, supra note 174, at 145.
184. Lomenzo, supra note 181, at 947 (alteration in original). “A major
concern of any probate legislation or dispositive system is justice and fairness
for the successors.” Id. (citation omitted).
185. Fellows et al., supra note 170, at 324. Actually, protecting the
dependent family and promoting the nuclear family have been identified as two
of four community aims underlying the intestacy scheme. The others include:
“avoid[ing] complicating property titles and excessive subdivision of
property [and] encourag[ing] the accumulation of property by individuals.” Id.
186. Lomenzo, supra note 181, at 947.
187. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 78. However, in some states, a
surviving spouse must share the estate with the descendants or, if the decedent
left no descendants, with the parents of the decedent. See id. at 63–64.
188. See Julia Frost Davies, Note, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the
Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV.
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Notably, non-relatives almost never inherit under the intestacy
statutes no matter how emotionally close they were to the decedent.
Indeed, as one commentator notes, “[w]hen no ‘close’ family
members survive, the law ignores those in intimate, dependent
relationships with the decedent to confer windfalls on distant
189
relatives who may not even have known the decedent.”
Accordingly, “a blended family member, extended family member, or
nonrelative who was the decedent’s primary caregiver or long-term
dependent generally receives no recognition under intestate
190
succession statutes.”
A person who falls into one of these
categories is thus considered to be “an ‘unnatural’ recipient of the
191
decedent’s estate.”
Nonetheless, individuals have quite a bit of control in
determining whether they will be subject to their state’s intestacy
scheme. Indeed, “an individual can freely determine the disposition
192
of wealth owned at death by executing a will.” Thus, the intestate
scheme exists merely as a default mechanism that will come into
193
play only if the decedent fails to execute a valid will.
Despite this
fact, the laws of intestacy continue to play a preeminent role within
the law of inheritance simply because the majority of Americans die
194
each year without a will. Furthermore, studies reveal that a large
percentage of those who die intestate are people with modest
195
estates. In fact, one study found that 72.3% of those whose estates

1055, 1072 n.130 (1995) (referring to the Uniform Probate Code).
189. Foster, supra note 2, at 206–07.
190. Id. at 207–08 (footnotes omitted).
191. Id. at 208 & n.45 (“We must conclude the gift to [the legatee] is
‘unnatural’ because he would not inherit under the laws of intestacy . . . .”
(quoting In re Estate of Gersbach, 960 P.2d 811, 817 (N.M. 1998))).
192. Fellows et al., supra note 170, at 322; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 29 (1994) (“People
whose individuated intention differs from common intention must assume the
responsibility of making a will; otherwise, their property will be distributed, by
default, according to common intention or, more accurately, according to
intention as attributed to them by the state legislature.”).
193. See Gary, supra note 2, at 1 (“An intestacy statute can serve as a
default rule, but a person whose wishes do not fit the default rule must execute
a will.”).
194. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 59 (“In surveys taken in the
last 10 years, 39 to 48 percent of adults claim to have a will.”); Fellows et al.,
supra note 170, at 337 (reporting the results of a study in which 45% of the
respondents had wills).
195. See Fellows et al., supra note 170, at 336 (noting prior studies that
found that “wealth, age, and occupation are directly related to the frequency of
testacy”); Gary, supra note 2, at 14 (“[I]ntestacy statutes will apply most often
to persons with modest estates.”).
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In
were valued at between $0 and $99,999 did not have wills.
contrast, only 15.4% of those with estates valued between $200,000
197
and $1 million did not have a will. Thus, given the relatively large
number of people for whom the dictates of the intestacy statutes are
a reality, commentators have been understandably quite critical of
the failure of those statutes to accurately reflect the general
composition of American families.
A.

Criticisms of Modern Intestacy Law

The problem with most contemporary intestacy statutes is that
198
they are, simultaneously, both overinclusive and underinclusive.
The statutes are overinclusive in the sense that the law of intestacy
199
is concerned solely with legal status.
Thus, even an “unworthy”
200
heir, short of having murdered the decedent, is protected by the
intestacy statute so long as he occupied the requisite legal
relationship to the decedent.
However, it is the underinclusive nature of the status-based
scheme that is frequently identified as being the more troublesome
complaint against the law of intestate succession. Specifically,
critics have noted how the narrow view of family in inheritance law
undermines the important policies of honoring donative intent and
201
protecting the financially dependent family.
Accordingly, to make
the laws of inheritance more inclusive and representative of the
different family models in which individuals may align themselves,
critics have called for reform of the definition of “family” in the
202
intestacy statutes.
These calls for reform can be principally

196. See Waggoner, supra note 192, at 29 (citing Fellows et al., supra note
170).
197. Id. at 30.
198. See Gary, supra note 2, at 41.
199. See Brashier, supra note 174, at 145; Foster, supra note 2, at 206 (“The
decedent’s closest relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage automatically
inherit, irrespective of their actual relationship with the decedent.”); Gary,
supra note 2, at 41 (noting that “legal ties do not necessarily create familial
ties”).
200. For a discussion of how different states have prevented killers from
inheriting from their victims, see Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not
Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489, 490 (1986) (“Relying on the
equitable maxim that individuals should not profit from their own wrongful
acts, courts and legislatures bar slayers from taking their victims’ property or
in any way benefiting economically from the premature death of their victims.”).
201. See, e.g., Brashier, supra note 174, at 145 (noting how the current
practice of basing intestate succession entirely on legal status “can lead to
arbitrary results that send a decedent spinning in his grave”); Holob, supra note
5, at 1510–12.
202. Particularly vulnerable to this underinclusiveness are those families
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203

divided into two main approaches: the formal and the functional.
Under the formal approach, lawmakers simply expand the
statutory definition of “family” to include specific individuals outside
204
the traditional nuclear family.
For example, by redefining
“children” in an intestacy statute to include adopted children, the
law has expanded a person’s ability to qualify as an intestate “heir”
205
solely by virtue of being formally adopted.
Nonetheless, the
formal approach is still concerned exclusively with legal status.
Thus, using the above example, even though the law now includes
adopted children as “children” for purposes of intestate succession, it
is still exclusively that person’s legal status as “adopted child” that
206
permits such inheritance.
In contrast, the functional approach looks beyond legal status
and into the actual relationship that the individual shared with the
decedent. In other words, it “inquires whether a relationship shares
the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship
207
and fulfills the same human needs.”
Thus, a purely functional
approach would focus not on whether an individual was the
biological or adopted child of the decedent, but on whether the
individual and the decedent actually shared a parent-child
relationship. In this sense, the functional approach is more tailored
to the individual decedent.

who do not conform to the “traditional” family model. See, e.g., Brashier, supra
note 174, at 189–92 (advocating reform of the intestate statutes to better reflect
the role of half-blood siblings); Gary, supra note 177, at 680 (seeking reform of
intestacy statutes for step-children); Seidman, supra note 169, at 233
(proposing that the Uniform Probate Code define and identify “committed
partners” in the intestate succession scheme).
203. See Family Resemblance, supra note 1, at 1644–48.
204. See Gary, supra note 2, at 31–32 (describing the formal approach as
“bringing ‘new’ families into the fold”); Family Resemblance, supra note 1, at
1644–45.
205. The formal approach is not limited to parent-child relationships. For
example, in the case of half-blood siblings, a state legislature could simply
redefine “sibling” to encompass half-blood as well as whole-blood siblings.
Furthermore, one state has even taken a formal approach to giving intestate
succession rights to same-sex couples. Specifically, the state of Hawaii allows
same-sex couples to register as “reciprocal beneficiaries.” HAW. REV. STAT. §
572C-3 to -5 (2006). By so doing, each beneficiary is entitled to inherit from the
other the same way that a spouse would. Id. § 560:2-102.
206. See Gary, supra note 2, at 39 (noting that, in regards to the current
laws of intestate succession regarding an adopted child, “the question for
inheritance purposes is the formal legal definition of family rather than
whether the person functioned as a family”).
207. See Family Resemblance, supra note 1, at 1646.
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Equitable Adoption

The equitable adoption doctrine, at least in theory, is one
208
example of the functional approach.
Indeed, unlike the formal
approach and its preoccupation with the legal relationship of the
decedent and his survivors, it is only the explicit absence of such a
relationship that even causes the doctrine of equitable adoption to
come into play. Specifically, equitable adoption is designed to
protect the inheritance rights of an individual who, believing himself
to be the child (whether biological or adopted) of the decedent,
nonetheless lacks the legal status of “child” as defined in the
209
intestate succession statutes.
To illustrate, consider the following
scenario:
At a young age, Bill is either orphaned or his biological parents
simply decide they cannot care for him. At any rate, a foster parent
takes Bill in her home and raises him until he is an adult, providing
for him just as she would a biological or formally adopted child.
Now, it could be that during Bill’s time in the foster parent’s home,
the foster parent either attempted but did not complete a formal
adoption or that the foster parent simply did nothing. Nonetheless,
Bill grows up believing that the foster parent, for all intents and
purposes, is his parent.
Bill’s belief could be based on a
representation by the foster parent of Bill’s status or could simply be
an assumption arising out of the foster parent’s silence on the issue.
Subsequently, the foster parent dies without a will, leaving Bill with
the belief that he will inherit his “parent’s” estate. However, during
the probate process, Bill actually learns that he has no right to
inherit because he lacks any blood or legal ties to the decedent.
Given the problem posed by this illustration, equitable adoption
can accomplish two noteworthy goals. First, it protects children like
Bill, who lack the legal status of “child,” from automatic

208. RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS’ ESTATES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 92 (2006) (“[U]nlike a statute that seeks uniformity,
equitable adoption derives from the facts of each situation.”). This is not to
suggest, however, that equitable adoption is the sole functional test found in the
various laws to intestate succession. For instance, the Uniform Probate Code
prohibits a parent from inheriting from or through a child if that parent failed
to “openly treat the child as his” or “refused to support the child.” UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114(c) (10th ed. 1991). Furthermore, California has a statute
in place that, by utilizing a functional approach, allows a stepchild to inherit in
limited circumstances. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (Deering 2002).
209. See generally William G. Reeves, Inheritance by Equitable Adoption: An
Overview of Theory and Proof, 57 J. MO. B. 130 (2001); Rein, supra note 12, at
766 (“Although not adopted with statutory formalities, the equitably adopted
child may be able to maintain a claim in equity to at least some of the benefits
that come with the status of a biological or legally adopted child.”).
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disinheritance. However, to those who criticize the underinclusive
nature of the intestacy statutes, it is the second accomplishment
that is perhaps the most significant.
Namely, the doctrine
affirmatively frees both judge and jury from the constraints of the
current intestate statutes and their narrow definition of “child.”
Indeed, the equitable adoption doctrine permits a decision maker to
look not only at statutory definitions, which, as noted earlier, are
largely based on the nuclear family model, but also at the discrete
relationship between a specific decedent and a specific individual
claiming to be the decedent’s “child.”
When analyzing such a relationship under the equitable
adoption doctrine, courts have relied on two different theories for
210
justification: a contract-based approach and an estoppel approach.
However, under both approaches, and despite the fact that the
doctrine permits a more functional approach to determining
inheritance rights, courts have nonetheless created rather rigid
proof requirements that have served to limit the benefits of the
211
equitable adoption doctrine.
1.

Theories of Recovery

Before getting into the current limits of the equitable adoption
doctrine, it is important to understand the theoretical
underpinnings that courts have used to justify the doctrine and its
rather drastic departure from the plain language of the intestacy
statutes. Currently, recovery is justified either as the specific
performance of an unfulfilled contract to adopt between the natural
and foster parents or an equitable estoppel of the one’s ability to
212
deny the status of an individual as having been adopted.
In
essence:
The doctrine is predicated on principles of contract law and
equitable enforcement of the agreement to adopt for the
purpose of securing the benefits of adoption that would
otherwise flow from the adoptive parent under the laws of
intestacy had the agreement to adopt been carried out; as such
it is essentially a matter of equitable relief. Being only an
equitable remedy to enforce a contract right, it is not intended
or applied to create the legal relationship of parent and child,
with all the legal consequences of such relationship, nor is it
213
meant to create a legal adoption.

210. See infra notes 212–29 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 230–35 and accompanying text.
212. Reeves, supra note 209, at 130 (quoting Weidner v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
213. In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2003).
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Although the two theories have already been discussed
214
extensively by other commentators, a brief overview is nonetheless
necessary before moving on to the constraints that judges have
imposed on the equitable adoption doctrine, regardless of the
underlying theory.
In looking at the specific performance theory of recovery, the
Supreme Court of Arizona laid out the following criteria:
This court has in two instances recognized the widely held
doctrine of equitable adoption, and laid down the following
principles: (1) the promisor must promise in writing or orally
to adopt the child; (2) the consideration flowing to the promisor
must be twofold: (a) the promisee parents must turn the child
over to the promisor, and (b) the child must give filial
affection, devotion, association and obedience to the promisor
during the latter’s lifetime; (3) when upon the death of the
promisor the child has not been made the legally adopted child
of the promisor, equity will decree that to be done which was
intended to be done and specifically enforce the contract to
adopt; (4) the child will be entitled to inherit that portion of
the promisor’s estate which he would have inherited had the
215
adoption been formal.

Thus, under the contract approach, courts first require the
existence of a contract to adopt between the decedent and the
216
natural parents.
Once such an agreement is proven, these courts
will then “presuppose that the foster parent as promisor has

214. See Reeves, supra note 209, at 130–35; Rein, supra note 12, at 770–80;
R. Brent Drake, Note, Status or Contract? A Comparative Analysis of
Inheritance Rights Under Equitable Adoption and Domestic Partnership
Doctrines, 39 GA. L. REV. 675, 681–92 (2005); James R. Robinson, Comment,
Untangling the “Loose Threads”: Equitable Adoption, Equitable Legitimation,
and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48 EMORY L.J. 943, 954–67
(1999).
215. In re Estate of Lamfrom, 368 P.2d 318, 320–21 (Ariz. 1962). The
Supreme Court of Utah has stated that:
It is generally recognized that where a child’s parents agree with the
adoptive parents to relinquish all their rights to the child in
consideration of the adoptive parents’ agreement to adopt such child,
and to care and provide for it the same as though it were their own
child, and such agreement is fully performed by all parties connected
with such contract except there is no actual adoption, the courts will
decree specific performance of such contract and thereby award to the
child the same distributive share of the adoptive parents’ estate as it
would have been entitled to had the child actually been adopted as
agreed.
In re Estates of Williams, 348 P.2d 683, 684 (Utah 1960).
216. See Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1951) (“[T]he
agreement to adopt . . . [is] a necessary predicate for the interposition of the
equity powers of the courts to decree an adoption by estoppel . . . .”).
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contracted to effect a legal adoption and that by granting relief the
217
court is specifically enforcing that contract.”
Of course, as
Professor Rein notes, this analysis is a bit artificial. Specifically, the
parties to such a “contract” would include, not the child, but the
natural and foster parents. Thus, the child is relegated to the
position of a third-party beneficiary, which is questionable given
that the child, in performing filial services to the foster parents, is
218
providing part of the consideration.
Furthermore, the contract
theory raises the thorny question of whether any person, given the
state’s interest in child welfare, has the ability to make a legal
219
contract that designates a child’s adoptor. Finally, even courts are
forced to concede that a contract to adopt cannot be specifically
220
enforced against someone who is already dead.
Indeed, as Rein
221
notes, “[a] corpse cannot adopt anyone.”
In contrast, courts using the estoppel approach, although still
requiring proof of an agreement to adopt, “stress the child’s
performance of filial services for the foster parent and purport to
protect the child ‘against the fraud of the adoptive parents’ neglect
or design in failing to do that which he in equity was obligated to
222
do.” As the Missouri Court of Appeals explained:
“Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby
voluntarily assuming the status of parent, and by reason
thereof obtains from the child the love, affection,
companionship, and services which ordinarily accrue to a
parent, he is thereafter estopped to assert that he did not
adopt the child in the manner provided by law” provided that

217. Rein, supra note 12, at 770.
218. Id. at 772–73; see also Edward W. Bailey, Adoption “By Estoppel,” 36
TEX. L. REV. 30, 35 n.19 (1957) (“Regarded as a third-party-beneficiary contract,
it must be conceded that the arrangement is characterized by most peculiar
features, since the courts uniformly recognize that the child’s services constitute
the performance bargained for by the adopting parent.”).
219. See Rein, supra note 12, at 773–74 (“A biological parent might be bound
by his promise to relinquish custody should the court find the relinquishment to
be in child’s best interest. But no court would enforce a new custodial
arrangement or agreed-upon adoption which it found to be inimical to the
child’s welfare.”).
220. See, e.g., Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (“Such an action seeks the specific performance of an agreement to adopt
after the death, intestate, of the last surviving putative foster parent, when,
paradoxically, the agreement can no longer be specifically performed.”); Wooley
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 45 P.2d 927, 931 (N.M. 1935) (“A specific performance
of a contract to adopt is impossible after the death of the parties who gave the
promise.”).
221. Rein, supra note 12, at 774.
222. Id. at 771 (quoting Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. 1940)).
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“justice, equity and good faith” compel a decree of equitable
adoption. One who seeks a decree of equitable adoption has
the onerous task of producing evidence so clear, cogent, and
convincing as to leave no reasonable doubt in the chancellor’s
223
mind.

Although this approach solves some of the questions raised by
the contract approach, Professor Rein points out that the estoppel
approach nonetheless leaves many unanswered questions.
Specifically, equitable estoppel requires a showing of three
elements: “(1) a promise or representation of fact; (2) actual and
reasonable reliance on the promise or representation; and (3)
224
resulting detriment.”
First, it is difficult for such a child to show
detriment given that the foster parents did provide the child with a
225
home and financial support.
Of course, as Rein notes, the
detriment could be psychological: “Any child who grows up with the
belief that he is a natural child of the only parents he knows is
bound to be distressed when he learns that society views him as a
226
legal stranger to his family.”
Furthermore, aside from the
problem with detriment, a proponent would also likely have
difficulty proving reliance. Indeed, it is unclear whether this
element requires that the child relied on the contract to adopt or on
227
the representation of his status as the decedent’s child. If it is the
former, then “[r]eliance on the agreement itself is usually impossible
because a young child cannot comprehend the import of a
228
contract.”
If instead the proponent is required to show a reliance
on status, then that too would be difficult to prove as “[i]t seems safe
to assume that most children, even if they knew of their lack of
status, would remain in the foster home and continue to act as
dutiful children simply because they would have no other viable
229
option.”
Thus, both the contract and the equitable estoppel theory leave
some unanswered questions. Nonetheless, these two approaches
continue to serve as the sole theories under which most courts have
223. Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (citations
omitted).
224. Rein, supra note 12, at 776.
225. Id. (“Detriment in the economic sense will usually be difficult to prove
because the foster parents have given the child the home, education, and
support that the biological parents were presumably unwilling or unable to
provide.”).
226. Id. at 778; see also infra notes 284–86 and accompanying text.
227. Rein, supra note 12, at 776; see also George C. Sims, Comment,
Adoption by Estoppel: History and Effect, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 162, 169 & n.39
(1963).
228. Rein, supra note 12, at 776.
229. Id.
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justified expanding the intestate succession definition of “children”
to encompass the equitably adopted.
2.

Current Limitations on the Scope of Equitable Adoption

Despite its potential to make the law of intestate succession
more inclusive, the doctrine of equitable adoption currently can
boast only limited success regardless of whether courts have adopted
a contract- or estoppel-based approach. First, as a preliminary
matter, the doctrine has been explicitly rejected by almost a third of
230
the courts who have even considered it. Those courts have done so
231
on the basis that adoption is exclusively governed by statute.
For
example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that “inheritance
under the theory of ‘virtual adoption’ is unknown to the law of
Arkansas [because the statutes relating to adoption] set out the only
232
method of adoption in Arkansas.” Furthermore, even among those
states that have recognized equitable adoption, every state but one
has nonetheless undermined the functional nature of the doctrine by
relying on rather formal and rigid criteria that have greatly limited
the doctrine’s effectiveness.
Specifically, as noted above, those courts have confined the
doctrine to only those scenarios in which the person claiming an
equitable adoption can first prove that a contract to adopt existed
between his natural parents and the decedent. This requirement in
itself precludes most informal adoptions, which would likely lack the
233
requisite contract.
Furthermore, the doctrine is limited further
because the proponent must prove not only the existence of a
contract to adopt, but also the terms and conditions of the
234
agreement.
Additionally, in attempting to make these required
showings, the proponent’s burden of proof has been described as
“highly rigorous” and requiring evidence that is “so clear, cogent and
235
convincing as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.”
Notably,
230. Drake, supra note 214, at 681 (“As of 1997 thirty-nine jurisdictions had
considered the equitable adoption doctrine. While twenty-seven jurisdictions
have clearly recognized the doctrine, at least twelve have not.” (footnotes
omitted)).
231. Id.
232. Wilks v. Langley, 451 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Ark. 1970).
233. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
234. Reeves, supra note 209, at 131–32; see also Eldred v. Glenn, 52 S.W.2d
35, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (“It will not satisfy the requirement to show that
there was an understanding of an indefinite character, leaving its terms more
or less to inference, that the child was to be taken [by the alleged adopter] and
reared as a member of the family.”).
235. Reeves, supra note 209, at 131; see also Coon v. Am. Compressed Steel,
Inc., 207 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (describing the same burden of
proof for proponents).
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these requirements exist regardless of whether the court is basing
recovery on the contract or the estoppel theory.
Of course, some courts have used the doctrine’s inherent
236
discretion
to
relax
these
rather
rigid
requirements.
Unfortunately, however, in so doing, the courts fail to adequately
explain their rationale, which results in an inconsistent application
237
of the doctrine.
For instance, in Laney v. Roberts, the proponent
admitted that she knew she had never been formally adopted and
238
also denied any knowledge of a contract to adopt.
As a result, the
proponent could not claim that she performed as the child of the
foster parents either in consideration of a contract to adopt or in
reliance upon any representation that she had been adopted.
Nonetheless, the Florida court allowed her claim merely noting,
with no further explanation, that “there is absolutely no evidentiary
value in the fact that [the proponent] knew she was not formally
adopted (which fact, by definition, is the gist of this lawsuit) or was
unaware of the agreement (to which she was not a party) between
239
her natural parents and [her foster parents].”
Furthermore, using the estoppel approach, some courts have
relaxed the requirement that the proponent prove reliance. For
example, in Mize v. Sims, the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected an
argument that an equitable adoption cannot take place unless “the
agreement of the adopting parent be communicated to the child so
240
that the child can act in reliance on the agreement.”
In so doing,
the court explained that “[w]e do not cast a burden upon a child of
241
tender age to remember events beyond his little comprehension.”
Furthermore, at least one court has dispensed with the reliance
requirement altogether. Specifically, in Calista Corp. v. Mann, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that, because of “the evidentiary
problems of proof,” it was not mandatory for the proponent to show
that
the foster parents . . . represented to the child, either expressly
or by their conduct, that he or she was adopted . . . [or that]
the child, to the extent that his or her age permitted, . . .
carried out his or her filial obligations in the belief that he or

236. Rein, supra note 12, at 783 (“Whatever the stated standard of proof,
courts can apply it with varying degrees of strictness depending on whether or
not they want to find a contract.”).
237. See Hargis, supra note 176, at 464 (noting that equitable remedies like
equitable adoption “are neither fairly nor consistently applied”).
238. 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
239. Id.
240. 516 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
241. Id.
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242

she was an adopted child.

However, it is troubling that the court failed to offer any
justification for its rather drastic departure from the requirements
for equitable estoppel.
In addition, courts using both approaches have permitted
proponents to demonstrate the existence of an adoption agreement
243
This evidence typically
through “circumstantial evidence.”
includes such things as (1) whether the child was taken into the
decedent’s home at a young age; (2) whether the child maintained a
relationship with his natural parents after being taken in by the
decedent; (3) whether the decedent held the child out publicly as his
own child; and (4) whether the decedent provided the child with any
inter vivos or testamentary gifts that would signify the decedent’s
244
recognition of the child as his own.
For example, even in the face
of weak evidence of an oral agreement to adopt, the Supreme Court
of Missouri nonetheless found that there had been an equitable
adoption based largely on the actions of the foster parents:
From the day she arrived in their home plaintiff was
unconditionally and absolutely held out to the world as the
daughter of Howard and Vera Hays and was so accepted by
the public generally. They did so with such amazing success
that for 27 years the people in the various communities where
the family lived thought she was their natural child. . . . To the
greatest extent possible they did everything they could to
make Virginia their natural child. All records (including school
and census) and all their statements and conduct so indicated.
Vera even prepared a family tree showing Virginia’s lineage as
245
their daughter.

However, it is important to note that, even though some courts
have allowed a proponent to demonstrate the existence of a contract
using these factors, the courts have nonetheless required that such
evidence be “consistent only with the existence of the equitable
adoption and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis
246
leaving nothing to conjecture.” Accordingly, courts have refused to
242. 564 P.2d 53, 62 & n.22 (Alaska 1977).
243. Rein, supra note 12, at 780 (“Although a few courts have insisted on
direct evidence of a contract, most permit proof by circumstantial evidence such
as ‘the acts, conduct and admissions of the parties.’” (footnote omitted)).
244. See Reeves, supra note 209, at 132–35; see also, Jess T. Hay & Ronald
M. Weiss, Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption, 9 SW. L.J. 90, 101–02
(1955) (“[T]he strongest type of circumstantial evidence consists of statements
made by the adopting parent during his lifetime from which the agreement may
be inferred.”).
245. Lukas v. Hays, 283 S.W.2d 561, 564, 567 (Mo. 1955).
246. Coon v. Am. Compressed Steel, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Mo. Ct. App.

W07-HIGDON.V2

264

6/28/2008 11:30:41 AM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

find equitable adoption when the facts merely indicated an intention
247
to adopt versus a promise to adopt.
Furthermore, the courts have
also held that proof of a family relationship alone is insufficient to
prove an equitable adoption given that the actions of the foster
parents could have been motivated solely by charity and kindness
248
and not a promise to adopt.
For example, the Texas Court of
Appeals refused to find an equitable adoption in the case of an aunt
who had taken in her niece:
It would not have been unnatural when viewed in the light of
common knowledge and experience for this aunt to take her
orphaned infant niece and rear her to maturity, giving her all
the care and advantages of which the aunt was capable,
receiving in turn that which was justly due in the way of
affection and normal services, without any agreement or
intention on the part of the aunt to adopt the child and thereby
make her a legal heir to property. Some one had to care for the
respondent or she would have become a charge upon the
249
public.

To be fair, the courts have imposed these strict requirements,
not in an effort to deny a worthy individual his inheritance, but to
250
protect the testator’s donative intent.
As the courts have noted, it
would not be unusual for a person to raise an orphan or abandoned
child purely out of charitable motives “without any agreement or
intention on the part of the [decedent] to adopt the child and thereby
251
make her a legal heir to property.”
Accordingly, the courts have
clung tightly to the rather high burden of proof on the basis that any

2006); see also Bellinger v. Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 779 S.W.2d 647,
650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
247. See, e.g., King v. Heirs & Beneficiaries of Watkins, 624 S.W.2d 252, 257
(Tex. App. 1981) (holding that “the testimony of witnesses as to [the decedent’s]
intention to adopt appellant cannot be considered as evidence of an agreement
to adopt”); House v. House, 222 S.W.2d 337, 338–39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
(finding no equitable adoption, even though the decedent “had expressed an
intention to sometime in the future adopt [the proponent]”).
248. Rein, supra note 12, at 782 (acknowledging that a “benevolent person
may, of course, take in a homeless child without intending to adopt him”).
249. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 978 (Tex. 1951); see also Garcia v.
Saenz, 242 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (“Acts of human kindness
referable to an undertaking to rear and educate a helpless child do not prove an
agreement to adopt.”).
250. See Rein, supra note 12, at 782 (“Courts that emphasize the high
standard of proof are trying to ensure that the alleged promisor truly intended
to adopt the child.”).
251. Bell, supra note 11, at 430 n.114 (citing Cavanaugh, 235 S.W.2d at
978).
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relaxation would be “tantamount to an invitation to fraud.”
Additionally, courts also point to the policy of protecting the welfare
of needy children as a basis for retaining the high evidentiary
standard: “If this rule is relaxed, then couples, childless or not, will
be reluctant to take into their homes orphan children, and for the
welfare of such children, . . . the rule should be kept and
253
observed.”
However, what these latter courts fail to consider is
that those “reluctant” parents, like all individuals, are free to make
a will to memorialize their desire that the foster child not inherit.
Despite these concerns, one court has nonetheless gone so far as
to affirmatively reject the requirement that the proponent first
254
prove the existence of a contract to adopt.
Specifically, in
Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Singer, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, in setting out the standard for equitable
adoption, stated that “[w]hile the existence of an express contract of
adoption is very convincing evidence, an implied contract of adoption
is an unnecessary fiction created by courts as a protection from
255
fraudulent claims.”
Instead, the court held that an equitable
adoption could take place even without a contract to adopt so long as
the proponent “can, by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, prove
sufficient facts to convince the trier of fact that his status is
identical to that of a formally adopted child, except only for the
256
absence of a formal order of adoption.”
In defining what
circumstances would be deemed “sufficient facts” for purposes of
proving an equitable adoption, the court relied on many of those
257
same circumstances, listed above,
that courts had used as
“circumstantial evidence” of a contract to adopt:

252. Reeves, supra note 209, at 131 n.19.
253. Benjamin v. Cronan, 93 S.W.2d 975, 981 (Mo. 1936).
254. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W.
Va. 1978) (“[I]f a claimant can, by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, prove .
. . that his status is identical to that of a formally adopted child, except only for
the absence of a formal order of adoption, a finding of an equitable adoption is
proper without proof of an adoption contract.”). Currently, West Virginia is the
only state that has jettisoned the contract requirement. However, the Court of
Appeals of New Mexico, although not going as far as West Virginia, has
affirmatively questioned whether that state should continue to adhere to the
contract requirement. Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMCA-137, ¶ 19, 965
P.2d 354, 361 (N.M. Ct. App.) (“Perhaps, however, our Supreme Court today
would not find it necessary to be as restrictive as it has been in the past, when
it has required an actual contract of adoption between the equitable parent and
the natural parents . . . .”) (citing Rein, supra note 12, at 785–86).
255. Wheeling Dollar, 250 S.E.2d at 374.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
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Circumstances which tend to show the existence of an
equitable adoption include: the benefits of love and affection
accruing to the adopting party, the performances of services by
the child, the surrender of ties by the natural parent, the
society, companionship and filial obedience of the child, an
invalid or ineffectual adoption proceeding, reliance by the
adopted person upon the existence of his adoptive status, the
representation to all the world that the child is a natural or
adopted child, and the rearing of the child from an age of
258
tender years by the adopting parents.

Thus, the Wheeling Dollar test is a much more inclusive and
functional incarnation of the equitable adoption doctrine. Although
it may, in essence, rely on the same factual findings that other
courts have relied upon, the Wheeling Dollar test uses those facts,
not to prove the preliminary issue of whether a contract to adopt
existed, but to determine the actual relationship that existed
between the proponent and the decedent, and whether those facts
indicate that this relationship was equal to that of parent and child.
IV. EQUITABLE ADOPTION’S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE
INFORMALLY ADOPTED
Given that the functional approach to defining family is
259
“inevitably comparative [in] nature,”
even when using the
functional approach to determining inheritance, courts must be
careful not to allow the nuclear-family model to serve as the guiding
standard.
To do so would be detrimental to nontraditional
260
families.
As Professor Susan N. Gary has noted, “[i]f the
functional definition of family is based on the way a nuclear family
functions, then many non-traditional families may still be left out of
261
the definition.”
As currently applied, the doctrine of equitable
adoption is a prime example of this very problem.
Specifically, by limiting recovery to only those individuals who
can prove the existence of a contract to adopt, the equitable adoption
doctrine, as it is currently applied in most states, is using the
nuclear-family model as a benchmark for relief. In essence, the
258. Wheeling Dollar, 250 S.E.2d at 373–74 (citations omitted).
Interestingly, the court also named certain circumstances that could help
negate a finding of equitable adoption, such as “failure of the child to perform
the duties of an adopted child, or misconduct of the child or abandonment of the
adoptive parents.” Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
259. Family Resemblance, supra note 1, at 1653.
260. Id. at 1642–44 (noting how the practice of defining “family” using the
nuclear-family model as the standard “has resulted in the denial of benefits to a
growing number of individuals involved in many different types of
nontraditional relationships”).
261. Gary, supra note 2, at 42.

W07-HIGDON.V2

6/28/2008 11:30:41 AM

2008] INFORMAL ADOPTION & INTESTATE SUCCESSION 267
current tests for equitable adoption only recognize those individuals
for whom the birth parents and the foster parents contemplated, yet
262
did not carry through with, an adoption contract.
However, as
detailed in Section II, for a large number of Americans, specifically
within the minority populations of the United States where the
extended family model is the norm, even the thought of a formal
263
adoption is somewhat rare and, in some cases, frowned upon.
Accordingly, the practice of informal adoption is much more common
264
within those families.
However, under the equitable adoption
doctrine, with the majority of courts insisting on the existence of a
contract to adopt, informally adopted children in those families
would rarely be able to recover under the equitable adoption
doctrine. To illustrate this difficulty and the resulting harm,
consider the result in Hattie O’Neal’s case as referenced at the
beginning of this Article.
Again, after the death of her mother, Hattie lived with a
number of individuals before her paternal aunt ultimately gave
265
Hattie to Mr. and Mrs. Cook.
Although the Cooks never adopted
the twelve-year-old girl, Hattie lived with the couple for
266
approximately fourteen years until she got married in 1975.
Additionally, the couple provided for Hattie’s education and referred
to her as their “daughter,” and to her children as their
267
“grandchildren.”
In 1991, Mr. Cook died intestate, and Hattie
268
claimed an interest in the estate as Mr. Cook’s daughter.
When
the administrator of the estate refused to recognize Hattie’s claim,
she filed suit asking the court to declare that Mr. Cook had
equitably adopted her, thus entitling her to inherit as though she
269
had been statutorily adopted by Mr. Cook.
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Hattie had not been
270
equitably adopted.
In an opinion that relied entirely upon the
contract theory of equitable adoption, the court began its analysis by
271
looking at whether there was a valid contract for adoption.
Furthermore, as a preliminary matter, the court stated that “[t]he
first essential of a contract for adoption is that it be made between

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 491 (Ga. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 491.
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By
persons competent to contract for the disposition of the child.”
finding that the parties did not have legal authority to consent to an
adoption, which is a precursor to any recovery under the contract
theory of equitable adoption, the court was able to quickly dispose of
273
Hattie’s claim.
In essence, Hattie lost because Estelle Page, the
paternal aunt who offered Hattie to the Cooks, did not have the
capacity to contract for Hattie’s adoption:
O’Neal concedes that, after her mother’s death, no
guardianship petition was filed by her relatives. Nor is there
any evidence that any person petitioned to be appointed as her
legal custodian. Accordingly, the obligation to care and provide
for O’Neal, undertaken first by Campbell, and later by Page,
was not a legal obligation but a familial obligation resulting in
a custodial relationship properly characterized as something
less than that of a legal custodian. Such a relationship carried
with it no authority to contract for O’Neal’s adoption. . . .
Because O’Neal’s relatives did not have the legal authority to
enter into a contract for her adoption, their alleged ratification
of the adoption contract was of no legal effect and the court did
not err in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
274
favor of the [administrator of the estate].

In her dissent, Justice Sears-Collins argued in favor of moving
away from basing equitable adoption on a strict application of
275
contract law.
Her dissent pointed out that, under contract law,
the requirement that a person have legal authority to consent to an
adoption is designed to protect not only the child and the adopting
276
parents, but also the person who has arranged the adoption.
However, as the dissent noted, in the context of an equitable
adoption claim, the adopting parents have died, and the only party
277
with any interest to be protected at that point is the child.
According to the dissent, by then penalizing that child for someone
else’s failure to comply with contract requirements, the majority had
272. Id. The full test that the court relied upon also requires:
Some showing of an agreement between the natural and adoptive
parents, performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up
custody, performance by the child in living in the home of the adoptive
parents, partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child
into the home and treating [it] as their child, and . . . the intestacy of
the foster parent.
Id. (quoting Williams v. Murray, 236 S.E.2d 624, 625 (Ga. 1977) (alterations in
original)).
273. Id. at 492.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 494 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 493 (citing 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS § 21.11 (2d ed. 1987)).
277. Id. at 493–94.
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failed to honor the maxim that “[e]quity considers that done which
278
ought to be done.”
As a result, the dissent advocated that the
court “abandon the contract basis for equitable adoption in favor of
279
[a theory that is] more flexible and equitable.”
In neither the majority nor the dissent, however, do any of the
justices take note of the racial or cultural background in which this
case arose. For instance, nowhere in the opinion does the court note
any of the circumstances that might have made it either unlikely or
extremely difficult for the Cooks to adopt Hattie. For instance,
nowhere in the opinion is it revealed that Hattie O’Neal is African
American, that the rural Georgia town where she lived with the
Cooks has a mere population of 767 (751 of which are African
American), or that there were no lawyers in that town during the
280
time period in which Hattie came to live with the Cooks.
In fact,
all the court ever really says as to Hattie’s background is that “we
281
sympathize with O’Neal’s plight.”
Although the reader does not
know what the court meant by “plight,” by calling it “O’Neal’s
plight,” there is some implication that the situation in which Hattie
had found herself was somehow exclusive to her. However, as
evidenced by the prevalence of informal adoptions in the minority
communities within the United States, if the law continues to fail to
account for cultural differences in the area of equitable adoption,
Hattie’s plight could very well become the plight of many
Americans.
V.

PROPOSAL

As illustrated by the harsh result in Hattie’s case, the law of
inheritance as it currently exists in most states effectively excludes
a number of minority children residing in “nontraditional” families.
Thus, just as the law of inheritance has already taken some steps to
protect America’s changing families by including illegitimate and
adopted children, the law nonetheless needs to recognize that a
number of children are still being excluded from inheritance rights.
While others have focused on the discriminatory impact that the
current laws of intestate succession have on stepchildren, the
purpose of this Article is to focus on another class of children who
face similar discrimination.
Specifically, a large number of

278. Id. at 494.
279. Id. The dissent would still hold that children have to “sufficiently
establish the existence of the contract to adopt.” Id. at 493. However, the
dissent would not require, as a prerequisite to recovery, that the party who
entered into that contract had the legal authority to do so. Id.
280. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 99.
281. O’Neal, 439 S.E.2d at 492.
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informally adopted children, many of whom are found in the African
American and Hispanic American communities, are facing the
threat of disinheritance simply by virtue of being reared in a
nontraditional family.
As an initial matter, failing to protect these children
substantially undermines several of the policies behind inheritance
rights. First, allowing a natural or adopted child to inherit while, at
the same time, excluding a child whom the decedent considered to
be the equivalent of a natural or adopted child fails to effectuate the
decedent’s donative intent. Given that the law of inheritance is
concerned only with effectuating the donative intent of the average
decedent, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the average
decedent who informally adopts a child, just like the decedent who
formally adopts, would intend for that child to inherit.
Second, the failure to include an informally adopted child also
undermines the policy of protecting the financially dependent
family. Just as a decedent’s natural, adopted, and illegitimate
children may be financially dependent on the decedent, so too would
an informally adopted child. In fact, given that both informal
adoptions as well as the likelihood of intestacy are more common in
282
poorer families, informally adopted children are much more likely
to be harmed financially if prevented from inheriting from their
“parents” as those children may not have many other resources. At
the very least, however, given these two policies underlying the law
of inheritance, there is no basis for distinguishing between children
283
who are formally adopted and those who are informally adopted.
By excluding an informally adopted child, inheritance law not
only fails to provide financial support for that child, but also denies
that child a sense of emotional support. As Gary explains, “[a]n
intestacy statute provides emotional support to family members
simply by identifying them as persons entitled to a distribution from

282. See supra notes 89, 132–36, 195–96 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, it should be noted that these children, if not permitted to inherit
as the children of a decedent, will also be foreclosed from claiming Social
Secuity benefits.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(2)(A) (2000) (“In
determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently
insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social
Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution
of intestate personal property by [the state in which the decedent was
domiciled].”)
283. For this reason, it should be of no legal consequence that an informally
adopted child may actually be an adult when the foster parent dies. Indeed,
just as the law of intestate succession is already blind to a child’s age when
determining an adopted or biological child’s share, so too should be any system
designed to extend inheritance rights to the informally adopted.
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the decedent’s estate. By doing so, the statute validates their
284
relationship with the loved one who has died.”
Furthermore, the
absence of this emotional support can take a psychological toll on
those excluded from inheritance: “Loss of inheritance is upsetting
285
for financial reasons, but even more so for its psychological toll.”
Thus, at death, the informally adopted, while mourning the loss of
someone important in her life, is told that legally her relationship to
286
the person was unnatural.
Of course one of the justifications for limiting inheritance rights
to biological and adoptive children is the need to make the estate
administration process predictable and not unduly burdensome. As
a result, “[p]robate courts are accustomed to making heirship
determinations based on the existence of easily identifiable legal
287
relationships.”
Thus, some may argue that including informally
adopted children as potential heirs would have a number of
dangerous consequences: 1) it would make the process of identifying
one’s heirs much more lengthy and difficult; 2) it would give rise to
frivolous or perhaps fraudulent claims; and 3) it would make it more
difficult for an individual to predict the identity of his potential
heirs should he die intestate.
While the equitable adoption doctrine has already opened the
courthouse door to nonlegal relatives without any resulting flood of
litigation, the courts have greatly limited the number of people who
288
can qualify as having been equitably adopted.
However, in terms
of the goal of creating certainty and predictability in the intestate
scheme, these concerns should not outweigh the benefits of guarding
donative intent, protecting a decedent’s surviving family, and
creating a nondiscriminatory inheritance scheme.
As one
commentator has noted, “justice is more important than
289
certainty.”
Furthermore, when the intestacy scheme is in conflict
with the desires of the typical decedent, “the statute is probably
flawed, and public skepticism concerning the fairness of the probate
process results.”290

284. Gary, supra note 177, at 652.
285. Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 623
(1997).
286. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
287. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession
and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 936 (1989).
288. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
289. E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to Intestate
Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REV. 255, 288
n.142 (2002) (quoting Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected
Against Disinheritance?, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 425 (1997)).
290. Brashier, supra note 174, at 147.
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Nonetheless, these concerns over certainty and ease of
administration are important and should be considered when
designing any functional approach to intestate succession. Thus,
with those concerns in mind, what follows are two proposed
solutions that would remedy the failings of the equitable adoption
doctrine to be more inclusive of informally adopted children, and at
the same time, limit the potential for fraudulent and other claims
that would unduly burden the probate process.
A.

Reform the Equitable Adoption Doctrine

The first option is simply to reform the equitable adoption
doctrine as it currently exists. Specifically, courts should jettison
the requirement that, prior to even having the proponent’s
relationship with the decedent considered, the proponent first prove
the existence of a contract to adopt between the natural and foster
parents.291 As discussed earlier, and as was illustrated in Hattie
O’Neal’s case, this rigid requirement has in many cases denied
recovery to children who in all respects have been treated as the
decedent’s biological or adoptive child.292
Not only is this contract requirement fatal to many worthy
proponents, it is also unnecessary for granting relief. As Professor
Rein points out, “[i]f estoppel is the true basis for the granting of
equitable relief, whether or not a contract existed or even whether or
not the foster parent intended to formally adopt the child should be
beside the point.”293 Instead, Rein suggests that the focus need only
be on whether “the foster family’s acts or omissions induced the
child to believe that he was the foster parent’s biological or formally
adopted child.”294
However, the problem with this suggestion, just like the current
application of the equitable adoption doctrine, is that it continues to
use the nuclear-family model as the standard by which we would
continue to determine who is a “child.” Specifically, to require that a
child was led to believe that he had been formally adopted
effectively eliminates those situations where the child knows he has
not been formally adopted yet still believes himself to be the child of
the foster parents. Accordingly, given the nature of informal
adoption within the African American and Hispanic communities,
where formal adoptions are rare and sometimes even disfavored,295 a
slight modification to Rein’s suggestion is necessary. Thus, the test

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 265–74 and accompanying text.
Rein, supra note 12, at 786 (footnote omitted).
Id.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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that courts should use to determine whether an equitable adoption
took place is whether the acts or omissions of the foster parents led
the proponent to believe that the foster parents considered him to be
the equivalent of a natural or adopted child.
Accordingly, this Article suggests that until such time as
legislatures amend the inheritance laws to encompass informal
adoptions, courts should adopt a standard like that employed in
Wheeling Dollar.
Again, in Wheeling Dollar, West Virginia
dispensed with the contract requirement and instead now merely
requires the proponent to prove that “his status is identical to that
of a formally adopted child, except only for the absence of a formal
order of adoption.”296 By eliminating the contract requirement, the
court is then free to look solely at the relationship between the
proponent and the decedent. This relationship should be the sole
focus of the inquiry given that “most equitable adoption cases must
be stretched to establish the elements of either contract theory,” and
that “the real basis for the claim is the family relationship between
the decedent and an individual, who played the role of decedent’s
child, and who was a likely object of testamentary bounty.”297
In looking solely at the relationship between the two parties,
Wheeling Dollar again provides useful factors to help analyze the
relationship and whether it bears a close enough resemblance to
parent and child. As noted earlier, the court in Wheeling Dollar set
out the following circumstances that, if present, would satisfy the
court that an equitable adoption had taken place: performance of
filial services by the child; surrendering of ties by the natural
parents, the companionship and obedience of the child; an invalid or
ineffectual adoption proceeding; reliance by the child on his adoptive
status, the representation to others by the foster parents that the
child is a natural or adopted child; and the rearing of the child from
a young age by the foster parents.298
However, courts must be careful to realize that those
circumstances are merely factors and, in applying those standards,
to not let the nuclear family model serve as the criteria against
which those circumstances are measured. Specifically, there are two
such circumstances in Wheeling Dollar in particular that could be
problematic in this regard and thus warrant some discussion here.
First, Wheeling Dollar lists “the surrender of ties by the natural
parent” as one of the circumstances that would tend to show an

296. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W.
Va. 1978); see also notes 254–57 and accompanying text.
297. Mahoney, supra note 287, at 925–26.
298. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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equitable adoption.299 While such a factor, if present, would
certainly make it appear more likely that an equitable adoption had
taken place, it must be understood that the absence of this
circumstance should never be fatal. Indeed, within the extended
family model, it would not be uncommon for a child, although
informally adopted by a friend or family member, to nonetheless
maintain some contact with the biological parents.300 Second, as
noted in Part II, many informally adopted children may have
difficulty showing that there was “an invalid or ineffectual adoption
proceeding.”301 For instance, given the cultural predisposition
against formal adoption within the Hispanic community,302 it would
not be difficult to imagine an informally adopted Hispanic child who
not only could not point to a failed adoption proceeding, but who
affirmatively knew of the foster parent’s disdain for formal adoption.
Thus, to automatically hold the absence of any of these
circumstances against the child would reflect a cultural bias,
effectively penalizing that child for not being reared in a more
traditional nuclear-family model. Instead, these circumstances
should be treated only as individual factors, the absence of which
may be explained or supplemented by one of the other factors.
However, to offset the degree to which these suggestions would
relax the standard for equitable adoption, and perhaps invite
frivolous or fraudulent claims, the “representation to all the world
that the child is a natural or adopted child”303 factor should be
changed to whether the proponent and decedent held themselves out
as parent and child for a substantial period of time.304 As an initial
matter, the wording is changed to eliminate the inherent cultural
bias given that the former could imply that the foster parent would
299. Wheeling Dollar, 250 S.E.2d at 373.
300. For example, Charmaine Yoest, in looking at one family in which a
grandmother informally adopted one of her grandchildren, describes the
situation as follows:
Though Gale’s mother was present, Grandma Jones was always the
children’s primary caregiver. Gale says of her mother, “It was like she
was my sister.” Gale distinctly remembers her mother sitting down in
the kitchen one day and deliberately deciding that Gale would belong
to her grandparents, while the other two children would remain hers.
“My mother informally gave me to my grandparents,” says Gale.
Yoest, supra note 88, at 8–9.
301. See Wheeling Dollar, 250 S.E.2d at 373.
302. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
303. See Wheeling Dollar, 250 S.E.2d at 373.
304. Some courts have employed a similar factor in deciding equitable
adoption claims. See, e.g., Lawson v. Atwood, 536 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ohio
1989) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that the “child and the one
claiming to be parent have held themselves out to be parent and child for a
substantial period of time”).
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have to hold a nonbiological child out as being formally adopted,
which, again, may be a term that is either unknown or avoided by
the members of some ethnic communities.
However, the more substantial change is the requirement that
this “holding out” exist for a substantial period of time. Although
courts would be free to define what constitutes the requisite time
period, requiring some continuous and extended demonstration of a
parent-child relationship should dissuade individuals from bringing
weaker or frivolous claims, which will help to promote some degree
of predictability and also to not unduly burden the administration of
probate. Furthermore, as noted in Part II, many informal adoptions
begin as temporary placements and, over time, grow into something
305
permanent.
By requiring that the parent-child relationship exist
for a certain period of time, the law can eliminate the chance that
the decedent was merely providing temporary care to the proponent
at the time of death.
Furthermore, to also help limit meritless claims, courts should
continue to require that a proponent prove his claim by clear,
306
cogent, and convincing evidence.
B.

Create a Statutory Solution

The above proposal to reform the doctrine of equitable adoption
should be viewed merely as an interim step to reform. Ultimately,
the recognition of informally adopted children as potential heirs
needs to come from the state legislatures in the form of revisions to
the current statutes governing intestate succession. In fact, a
statutory approach is necessary to cure a number of problems posed
by the equitable adoption doctrine.
First and foremost, a number of state courts have refused to
even recognize equitable adoption on the basis that adoption is
307
purely a creature of statutory law.
By expanding the existing
intestacy statutes to permit a functional approach to defining the
parent-child relationship, these states would seemingly no longer
have any objection to allowing informally adopted children to
petition the court for inheritance rights equal to a formally adopted
child. Thus, more informally adopted children nationwide would
have protections equivalent to those afforded by the equitable
adoption doctrine as proposed above.
Second, such a change to the existing inheritance law is quite a
305. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
306. Incidentally, it should also be noted that the Wheeling Dollar opinion
was issued in 1978, and since that time, there has been no indication of any
resulting increase in cases in West Virginia involving equitable adoption claims.
307. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
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large step away from the traditional objective-based approach to
determining inheritance rights. As a result, there are likely to be a
number of concerns and unanswered questions, which the state
legislature is better equipped to answer. For example, Professor
Rein noted a number of questions that have already arisen in the
context of, what Rein terms, the “Pandora’s Box” of equitable
308
adoption.
Some of the toughest questions raised by the equitable adoption
doctrine center around the extent of the inheritance rights afforded
an equitably adopted child. Although any recommendations on
these questions are beyond the limited scope of this Article,
identifying some of the issues relating to the equitable adoption
doctrine helps illustrate the need for a statutory solution. First,
states must determine whether the equitably adopted person is
limited to inheritance from the foster parent or whether he may also
inherit from the foster parent’s blood relatives. Thus far, the states
309
are in disagreement.
Second, in many states, a person loses the
right to inherit from her biological parents once she has been
310
formally adopted.
The question then arises of whether an
equitably adopted child should be treated in a similar fashion.
Although no case law currently exists on this topic, it is only a
matter of time before a state court will be forced to resolve this
admittedly complicated issue. Just as the various state legislatures
have been charged with defining the inheritance rights of adopted
children vis-à-vis their biological parents and adoptive parents, so
too should the state legislatures be entrusted with developing
solutions to these issues as they relate to equitably adopted
children.
Finally, some of the other questions raised by the equitable
adoption doctrine that would be best left to the state legislatures
include:
Does an equitably adopted child have standing to contest the
unfavorable will of his foster parent? After divorce, does the
foster parent have a continuing duty to support his equitably
adopted child, and, if so, is the biological parent still liable for
child support? Can the equitably adopted child recover a
work[er]’s compensation death benefit for the death of his
308. Rein, supra note 12, at 768.
309. Compare Board of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 380 (Md. 1994)
(holding that an equitably adopted child could not inherit from the foster
parent’s sister), with First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont v. Phillips, 344 S.E.2d 201,
205 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that an equitably adopted child could inherit from
another child of the foster parent).
310. See Rein, supra note 12, at 718–31 (discussing the various approaches
that states have used to determine the inheritance rights of adopted children).
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foster parent? Can the foster parent recover a work[er]’s
compensation death benefit for the death of his equitably
adopted foster child? Can the equitably adopted child bring a
wrongful death action for the death of his foster parent? Can
the foster parent bring a wrongful death action for the death of
his equitably adopted child? When a stranger to the informal
adoption makes a gift in a private instrument to someone
else’s “children,” “issue,” “grandchildren,” or “heirs,” can one
311
enter the designated class by way of equitable adoption?

Given this long list of questions associated with extending
inheritance rights to the functional equivalents of children, it would
be much more efficient for a state legislature to answer all of these
questions at once in the form of a statutory scheme, as opposed to
sitting back and waiting for a court, under the equitable adoption
doctrine, to formulate answers to these difficult questions as they
happen to arise.
A third benefit to a statutory solution would be a greater
effectuation of the policy that inheritance rights should provide
some element of certainty and predictability. By leaving the matter
entirely to the courts, a likely proponent of equitable adoption would
be less likely to even know that such a remedy is available and also
to know what standards or criteria are to be used to decide such a
claim. As noted earlier, the doctrine of equitable adoption as it
currently exists is applied more or less strictly depending on the
312
actual court deciding the case.
A statutory scheme would be
capable of providing a single, more specific standard. Furthermore,
given the unanswered questions listed above, many proponents
would be proceeding with their claims in the dark until such time as
a court had cause to resolve all of those issues, which again, could be
resolved all at once by the state legislature.
The final benefits of a statutory remedy flow from the problems
typically associated with equitable remedies. First, as pointed out
above, there are a number of questionable assumptions underlying
the theory of equitable adoption, namely whether it is based on
313
specific performance or equitable estoppel.
A statutory remedy,
then, would eliminate the need for such legal fictions and allow the
314
courts to instead simply apply the relevant statute.
Additionally,
a statutory remedy would permit courts to avoid the specter of
engaging in what has been pejoratively described as “judicial

311. Id. at 768–70.
312. See supra notes 236–42 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 212–29 and accompanying text.
314. See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 547–48 (using the equitable adoption
doctrine’s theories of recovery as examples of legal fictions that are ill-suited to
the facts of the cases).
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legislation.”
Given then that the problem of creating a more functional
scheme for defining an intestate decedent’s “child” is best dealt with
statutorily, a seemingly daunting question arises: What should such
a statute look like? However, one scholar has already proposed a
statute that would effectively accomplish the goal of giving
informally adopted children a realistic chance of qualifying as a
decedent’s child.
Specifically, in arguing that stepchildren should be afforded the
same inheritance rights as natural and adoptive children, Gary
proposes the following language that could be added to the
definitions of “child” found in current intestacy statutes:
(a) [A]n individual is the child of another individual and
an individual is the parent of another individual if the person
seeking to establish the relationship proves by clear and
convincing evidence that a parent-child relationship existed
between the two individuals at the time of the decedent’s
death . . . .
(b) [Factors] Although no single factor or set of factors
determines whether a relationship qualifies as a parent-child
relationship, the following factors are among those to be
considered as positive indications that a parent-child
relationship existed:
(1) The relationship between the parent and child began
during the child’s minority. The younger the child, the greater
the weight to be given to this factor;
(2) The duration of the relationship was sufficient for the
formation of a parent-child bond;
(3) The decedent was married to or was a committed
partner of a biological or adoptive parent of the child;
(4) The parent held the child out as his or her child,
referring to the child as his or her child or treating the child as
his or her child;
(5) The parent provided economic and emotional support
for the child; the child provided economic and emotional
support for the parent;

315. Id. at 535.
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(6) Treatment of the child by the parent was comparable
to the decedent’s treatment of his or her [biological or
adoptive] children; and
(7) The decedent named the child or parent as a
beneficiary to receive property at the decedent’s death through
316
a nonprobate transfer.

There are a number of advantages to this proposed statute.
Initially, to help prevent the problems of a resulting flood of
litigation and fraudulent claims, the requisite burden of proof would
317
still be clear and convincing evidence.
Furthermore, the language
explicitly states that the factors are not dispositive. As noted above,
when describing ways to reform the current equitable adoption
doctrine, the fact that extended families function in ways that are
sometimes quite different from nuclear families requires that there
be some flexibility in any functional test of “family.” Additionally,
Gary’s proposed statute lays out the functional test of child in a way
that is not culturally biased. Unlike the Wheeling Dollar test,
discussed above, the proposed statute does not require that the
foster parent treat or hold out the child as a “formally adopted
child.” Instead, the statute merely describes the test as “comparable
to the decedent’s treatment of his or her legal children.” In so doing,
the statute implicitly makes clear that a decedent could consider
someone to be her “child,” without using formal adoption as the
standard for comparison, given that this practice may be foreign or
even disdainful to many Americans in minority ethnic communities.
Furthermore, Gary has provided sufficiently specific factors to
limit a judge’s ability to use too much discretion when adjudicating a
318
claim. This element is key given that “[a]bandoning the simplicity
and consistency associated with objective rules is a scary proposition
319
for American probate law.”
Instead, Gary offers a combination
approach that does have some degree of flexibility, yet at the same
time relies on specific factors, many of which would require objective
evidence.
Such an approach was recommended by Professor
Brashier in proposing a statute to deal with the inheritance rights of
“half-bloods”: “Inheritance law could maintain much of its fixed-rule
simplicity and yet incorporate an element of inclusiveness and
316. Gary, supra note 2, at app.I.
317. Id. at 73. Furthermore, it should be noted that the statute would not
even come into play unless a proponent made an application with the court.
Otherwise, the current intestacy statute would apply.
318. See Hargis, supra note 176, at 464 (“Allowing discretion ensures more
consistent results than these equitable remedies, because they offer specific
guidelines in determining the case.”).
319. Brashier, supra note 174, at 188.
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flexibility by permitting probate courts to use extrinsic but objective
320
evidence concerning the decedent’s family relationships.”
Accordingly, by focusing on factors that are susceptible to objective
proof, Gary’s proposed statute provides a more inclusive scheme that
nonetheless retains some degree of certainty and predictability. In
addition, providing this list of objective factors would help provide
individuals with a better understanding of the consequences of
dying intestate given that all judges would be required to evaluate
the same factors. As one commentator has noted, “requir[ing] courts
to consider the same factors in each case [helps to] ensure fair and
321
consistent results.”
Nonetheless, for jurisdictions that perhaps agree in principle
with the proposed statute contained herein but who, nonetheless,
would like more limiting language, one possibility may be found in
England’s family maintenance statute. In England, “any person . . .
who immediately before the death of the deceased was being
maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased” and who was
so maintained for at least two years can apply for an intestate
322
share.
A somewhat similar restriction could also be added to the
above statute. Specifically, a proponent could first be required to
show that for a certain amount of time during the decedent’s life,
perhaps two years, he was financially dependent on the decedent.
Thus, the first paragraph of the statute would become:
[A]n individual is the child of another individual and an
individual is the parent of another individual if the person
seeking to establish the relationship proves by clear and
convincing evidence that both he or she was financially
dependent on the other for at least a two-year consecutive
period and that a parent-child relationship existed between
the two individuals at the time of the decedent’s death.

Courts would have to define “financially dependent”; however,
once the proponent made that required support showing, the court
would then proceed with the remainder of the statutory factors to
determine if a parent-child relationship existed at the time of death.
Having this threshold requirement could help eliminate weaker

320. Id. at 189.
321. Hargis, supra note 176, at 464.
322. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act of 1975, ch. 63,
§ 1(1)(e) (Eng. and Wales), amended by Civil Partnership Act of 2004, ch. 33, §
4(2) (Eng. and Wales). The statute further provides that “a person shall be
treated as being maintained by the deceased, either wholly or partly, as the
case may be, if the deceased, otherwise than for full valuable consideration, was
making a substantial contribution in money or money’s worth towards the
reasonable needs of that person.” Id. § 1(3).
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claims; yet, at the same time, it is not the sort of threshold
requirement—like the contract requirement that currently exists in
the equitable adoption doctrine—that would effectively bar a
number of deserving claims. Indeed, it is entirely reasonable to
expect that anyone who equitably adopted a child would have
provided financial support for that child. Furthermore, including a
time requirement (for the same reasons one is proposed above in
reforming the equitable adoption doctrine) would help provide a
greater sense of security that the proponent’s relationship with the
decedent was not merely a temporary arrangement that never
actually blossomed into a full-scale informal adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the law of intestate succession begins to move toward a more
functional approach in determining whether a parent-child
relationship exists, one must be cautious not to make those
determinations using the nuclear family as the standard by which
all other relationships are to be measured. Doing so effectively
ignores a large population within the United States and jeopardizes
the inheritance rights of some of the country’s more vulnerable
citizens. Currently, the doctrine of equitable adoption illustrates
this danger. By using formal adoption as the norm, the law
effectively disinherits those who were brought into a family by
virtue of informal adoption, a practice that is quite common in
America’s two largest ethnic minorities. Accordingly, to greater
protect the rights of these individuals, the law of intestate
succession needs to be expanded to permit such individuals, whom
the decedent treated as the equivalent of natural or adoptive
children, the right to claim an intestate share. Failure to do so not
only undermines the policies behind intestate succession, but also
serves to advance a system of inheritance that is both outdated and
discriminatory.

